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Iraq: Options and Obstacles

A CNP Conversation with Amb. James Dobbins and Maj. Gen. William Nash

May 22, 2007

Joining CNP to discuss the latest developments in Iraq were two of America's most eperienced experts in post-conflict transitions and nationbuilding. Ambassador James Dobbins worked on the Balkans in the 1990s and in 2001 he shepherded the Bonn Conference that set up the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan. Major General William Nash was commander of Task Force Eagle, the American component of the NATO force implementing the Dayton Accords. In 1999, as a civilian, Maj. Gen. Nash administered the Serb sector around Mitrovica after NATO forced Serbian forces to withdraw.

Full Transcript

MR. TIMOTHY ROEMER: Let me just begin by welcoming everyone. My name is Tim Roemer. I’m the president at the Center for National Policy and we are delighted to join with these two distinguished individuals – Major General William Nash and Ambassador James Dobbins – to talk about maybe the single most important issue in the United States Congress today, maybe the single most important issue across Europe today, and maybe the single most important issue across the globe.

We were very lucky, I think, last week to have a CNP event right here in this room on China and the strategic economic dialogue that is taking place this week.

We were very fortunate last week to also have a very, very hot event with Senator Chuck Hagel talking about global affairs and new strategic policies for the United States. And he gave a 40-minute, very eloquent address about where we need to go in the future for America’s role in the 21st century. That was part of CNP’s presidential series on trying to define with the presidential candidates on both the Republican and the Democratic side what we need to do new and differently going forward in the next presidential debate and in the presidential elections.

So we are very proud here at the Center for National Policy to support timely events; to support critically important global issues, whether they be China, comprehensive foreign policy issues, or today’s topic, Iraq: obstacles and options to moving forward.”

We can’t do any of these events without the strong support of our board, and I want to thank Peter Kovler, our chair, and John Freidenrich, a longtime, outstanding board member; Bernard Schwartz, an excellent contributor here to the Center for their very important help. I also want to quote Mark Twain. Twain once talked about the importance between using the right word and the almost-right word. And he talked about that being the difference between lightning and a lightening bug. We’ve got two people here that know their words; know the difference between the two; know how important it is to talk about these issues with papers, with policy options, and with real life experiences.

It’d be great – I think I’ll try a different introduction for both of them because it’d be great for me to go through Jim Dobbin’s résumé and the 30 years of experience in Europe and global strategy or Bill’s experience around Princeton and Georgetown and Harvard. I think what is most important today is not so much their academic credentials as their practical credentials.

Over to my left, General Nash was the commander of Task Force Eagle when it went into Bosnia with 25,000 troops and helped preserve the Dayton Accords. He practiced the stabilization and reconstruction model that many people think we need to do a much better job of implementing today. He did that from a military perspective.

And then over to my right, we have somebody who has effectively practiced this policy as an ambassador; as an assistant secretary of state; as a special assistant to the president in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

So between these two people, we have the kind of extraordinary experience that has successfully put Bosnia, for instance, in a position where they are now potentially belonging to the European Union and NATO, and we have peace in that region and the United States is not forking out taxpayer money year after year. They have applied a model that has worked and I think that’s one of the great areas of expertise that they bring today. I’m very delighted to have this important subject and I think I’ll ask Jim Dobbins to start and then General Nash to go after him. Then I’ll ask a few questions and we’ll open it up to the floor.

Jim, if you could start for us. Thank you for coming and if we could give him a warm welcome. The Center for National Policy welcomes you.

(Applause.)

AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS: Well, I think it’s generally recognized that we’re in the midst of a civil war in Iraq. The civil war was provoked by the American intervention. It was fueled by the American occupation. It was facilitated by the failure of the U.S. to establish a secure environment in the aftermath of Saddam’s fall.

We also know that the reasons for going into Iraq turned out to be largely spurious. There were no weapons of mass destruction. There were no operational links to al Qaeda. There were no terrorists of any consequence operating in Iraq. Unfortunately, the fact that the reasons for going in turned out to be inadequate doesn’t necessarily mean that there are no reasons for staying.

The reasons that one could adduce for staying in some capacity are, first of all, the degree of responsibility we’ve undertaken as a result of our intervention and the really horrific circumstances in which the Iraqis find themselves as a result. Four million of them have been pushed out of their homes. Two million of them fled the country. Thousands of them are being killed every week. So we’ve assumed heavy responsibilities as the result of our actions – actions which were directed by the president but supported by the Congress and opinion polls indicate broadly and very strongly supported by the American people as a whole.

In fact, there were few wars in our entire history as popular as the war in Iraq. The vote for the second Gulf War was much heavier, much more positive in the Congress than the vote for the first Gulf War. The Clinton administration didn’t even dare go to the Congress for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo because he wouldn’t even got 50 percent of the votes for them. So this was a war that was very broadly backed in the country.

Now, so the issue that we’re asked to discuss today are what are our options? In the midst of a civil war, you essentially have three theoretical choices. Choice one is that you put in adequate number of forces to suppress all sides in the conflict and then promote a process of reconciliation on the basis an imposed peace – what we did in Bosnia, for instance, or in Kosovo. That’s option one.

Option two is at the other extreme: you get out, you let them fight it out, you take the consequences, whatever they are. And then the middle option is – and having come from a Washington bureaucratic environment, you always know that the middle option is the one that you’re designed to pick. The middle option is that you pick a side and you help that side win. You don’t – and so which of those three options are we going to choose?

Now, the first option is clearly in many respects the most desirable, but it’s also the most expensive. And it probably exceeds the price that the United States is prepared to pay. One could calculate the size of the force that would be needed to impose peace on Iraq. The size that might have imposed peace in the aftermath of Saddam’s fall and in the absence of an active insurgency would probably have been somewhere between 350,000 and 500,000, according to most military estimates. One will have to assume that the number would actually be larger today given the much more difficult circumstances we face, but the 400,000-man figure is a figure that does translate to the size of the force in Bosnia, the size of the force in Kosovo in terms of the density of troops to population.

So that option probably isn’t available to us. The American people simply aren’t going to accept that option – aren’t going to resource that option. At the other end, the option is to simply get out and let events take their course and the problems there are not only have we assumed heavy responsibilities in the country, but we’ve transformed the situation in the country and the region in ways that make getting out a lot more dangerous than staying out would have been four years ago. First of all, there weren’t any terrorists when we got there. There are certainly any number of terrorists operating in Iraq at the moment. Now, most of them would stop being terrorists if we left, but a certain proportion probably wouldn’t and there would be some spillover into the region and perhaps even further abroad. But I think that the real reason for staying engaged, above and beyond that of responsibility to the Iraqi people, is the regional dimension and the prospect of this conflict spreading.

Now, in many ways, it has already begun to spread. You’ve got active fighting going on in Afghanistan. You have active fighting going on in Iraq. You have an intensifying confrontation with Iran. You have active fighting going on in Lebanon and you have active fighting going on in the Palestinian territories. In other words, the entire Middle East and Central Asia are aflame from the Hindu Kush to the Mediterranean. That’s the legacy that this administration is going to leave: active fighting from the Hindu Kush to the Mediterranean. And this could easily get worse rather than better and it’s possible that creating a vacuum in Iraq by reason of a full American departure could actually make that situation significantly worse.

So if that leads you to the middle option, okay, we have to stay engaged in some respect. We’re not going to be able to simply suppress the all sides in this conflict and impose a peace. We’re going to have to choose sides and – choose the least bad side and help it prevail over a more extended period of time, then of course the question is, well, what side do you choose?

And I don’t think it’s simply a question of choosing Shi’as, Sunnis or Kurds. I think we’ve facilitated the formation of a coalition which includes most of the Shi’as, all the Kurds, and a few Sunnis. And that’s probably who we have to back and we have to continue to support that coalition, try to attract in more Sunnis, and try to assist it in prevailing while at the same time responding to the imperative that comes from the American people on the one hand and the Iraqi people on the other hand which is to get out. I mean, that’s the imperative from both populations. So somehow a policy which on the other hand accommodates that imperative to some degree and on the other hand doesn’t abandon the country and our responsibilities in the region entirely seems to me to be the prudent way forward, which means reducing the American footprint size, reducing in particular the range of functions that the U.S. is performing – essentially turning over combat duties, urban-street fighting, patrolling to Iraqi forces and reducing the American presence so that it consists largely of advisors and enablers, the people who were providing the Iraqi’s capabilities that they are not in the position to provide themselves, things like logistic and air support and intelligence and other more specialized functions. This seems to me to be a way of accommodating the conflicting pressures and responsibilities and retaining some influence over the course of events.

Now, what are the risks of doing that? The risks of doing that are twofold; that is, of essentially pulling out most of the combat forces, turning those responsibilities over to the Iraqis, but retaining a presence and a support relationship. Risk one is that the government simply fragments and collapses – that it is unable to assume those additional responsibilities and an already weakened incompetent regime simply collapses entirely and nothing comes to replace it except sort of chaos and further disintegration. That’s a real risk that I think we face if we choose that option.

The other risk is that we’re associated with a regime that is both corrupt and engaged in large scale human rights abuses. And that’s not a risk, that’s a certainty. I mean, that certainly would be a cost of pursuing that middle option. That said, given the cost of the other two options, I still think that’s the least bad option. Now, so that’s part of what I would advocate is the way forward and the way to analyze what one’s realistic alternatives are here.

There are other things that one can do to try to ameliorate the situation. One is to engage the neighboring countries more effectively and more comprehensively than we have done in the past. If we learned anything about nation-building over the last 15 years, it’s that you can’t stabilize and unite a failed state and a divided society if its neighbors don’t want you to. The neighbors simply have too much influence, too much access by reason of their proximity and cultural affinities to be ignored. And you can tell them to butt out, you’ll take care of it, but they’re not going to. They’re going to interfere and they’re going to interfere because they can’t afford not to interfere. After all, it’s the neighbors, not us, who are going to get the refugees. It’s the neighbors, not us, who are going to get the terrorists. It’s the neighbors, not us, who are going to get the endemic disease and the corruption and the drugs and the commercial disruption and the economic dislocation that comes from having a failed state at your doorstep. So they can’t afford not to interfere. They will interfere.

The problem is that they will tend to interfere in ways that actually exacerbate the problem that they would rather ameliorate if they could. They don’t want a failed state on their doorstep, but the way they will interfere is by backing their preferred champions in the competition for power. In any failed state, every competitor for power looks for foreign sponsors and foreign sponsors look for their preferred surrogate. And the result is that the neighboring states tend to exacerbate the disintegration by backing competing factions for power.

The only way you can deal with that is not by telling them not to interfere. That’s a pointless exercise. It’s by getting them to put convergent pressures on their – on their surrogates. It’s by getting the foreign powers that are feeding and exacerbating it to actually work together to produce reconciliation rather than conflict.

If you look back at the end of the Bosnia Civil War in 1995, how did we engineer the end of that? We didn’t say Milosevic, Tudjman – you two guys are personally guilty of genocide. We’re not going to talk to you. We’re going to ostracize you. No, on the contrary, we said you two are personally guilty of genocide. You have to come to our conference. You have to become privileged partners in a negotiation to end this. You have to become a critical party in implementing that. And what happened? They both won elections as a result. They both – their positions were enhanced domestically. We abandoned the local opposition in those countries in order to work with these murderers.

But if we’d taken a position of, quote, “moral clarity,” we’d still be fighting or the Bosnians would still be fighting a civil war today rather than having kept that civil war ended as it was. Similarly, in Afghanistan in 2001, how did we move so quickly from the Taliban to moderate, broadly recognized government under Hamid Karzai? We moved there because we engaged the countries that have been fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan for 20 years in the process of creating a new, broadly-based Afghan government. We didn’t tell Russia and Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran to butt out, we’d take care of this. We invited them to the conference and they’ve been partners in the process of putting together a new government in Afghanistan which went rather successfully.

Now, in Iraq, we’ve approached this project in a way that made that kind of cooperation essentially impossible. We didn’t invade Afghanistan with the stated intention of turning it into a model for Central Asia based upon which we were then going to delegitimize the governments of all its neighbors and eventually change their form of government. That wasn’t our stated objective when we went into Iraq. If it had been, we wouldn’t have gotten bases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. We wouldn’t have gotten overflight rights in Pakistan. We wouldn’t have gotten Russian support for that basing. We wouldn’t have gotten an Iranian, Pakistani, Indian, and Russian support at the Bonn Conference for the formation of a new government.

We did go into Iraq with the stated, explicit objective of making it a model – a democratic model for the Middle East, with the stated intention of delegitimizing the form of government of every single one of its neighbors and ultimately causing those governments to be changed. This wasn’t a project that any of those governments were going to buy into, nor have they, nor have we made any serious effort to get them to buy into the project.

Now, I think we’re obviously starting four years too late to try and bring these governments into a more cooperative relationship with and effort to stabilize Iraq, but it’s not too late to start and to the extent that the United States is beginning, however gradually, to disengage, it may make them somewhat more serious about the process if we are prepared to first of all alter the manner in which we explain and see our role there and drop – or at least deemphasize heavily – the democratization regime-change transformational rhetoric and begin to emphasize things like sovereignty and territorial integrity and stability. These are concepts that all those neighboring states can buy into, and to the extent we begin to explain our intentions in those terms, we’ll have a better chance of securing some degree of cooperation with them.

Finally and lastly, the way we succeeded in Bosnia and Kosovo – I’m sorry, in Bosnia and in Kosovo and finally in Afghanistan, diplomatically, was that we made it the most important thing we were doing. We subordinated all other interests to getting that right.

In 1995, there was nothing more important than United States relations with any country in the Balkans, any country in Europe or Russia than Bosnia. And whatever the other concerns or whatever else they were doing to annoy us, it simply got put on the back burner. Yes, we weren’t happy that Milosevic was going to get reelected, but that wasn’t our problem that year. Yes, Kosovo was going to be a problem. We’d have to deal with it someday, but we weren’t going to deal with it in 1995. Similarly, in September, 2001, after 9/11, the most important issue on the U.S. agenda was overturning the Taliban, disrupting al Qaeda, and preventing Afghanistan from completely disintegrating. And we subordinated all our other concerns to that.

Now, one of the problems in Iraq is we’ve never been able to decide what we wanted to do. It’s never been plausible we were going to be able to stabilize Iraq and destabilize Iran and Syria at the same time. You simply can’t expect to do all three of those things simultaneously. You’ve got to choose what you want to do this year and what you want to do next year or the year after that. I mean, we eventually did overthrow Milosevic, but first we took care of Bosnia, then we took care of Kosovo and then we turned to the next item on our agenda. And so if there’s going to be any hope in stabilizing Iraq over the next year or two, we’re going to have to say this is the most important thing we’re going to do it. We don’t care about anything else this year. That is – we don’t care is a bit of an exaggeration, but we’re not going to provoke the end game of Iran’s nuclear policy at the same time we’re trying to attract it into a relationship in which they can provide some help in stabilizing Iraq. We’ll deal with that problem later. It’s got a 10-year time span according to the intelligence community. We’ll deal with that problem later. This year we’re going to deal with the problem that’s the number one problem. So setting priorities and deciding what to do first strikes me as a key to any chance of stabilizing Iraq.

And, finally, I’d just say that I am a bit concerned that the current emphasis on sort of conditional benchmarks doesn’t turn into essentially an excuse for the United States to blame its failure in Iraq on the Iraqis. It’s easy enough for us to say: well, we gave them a chance for democracy. They didn’t seize it. But if the Iraqis fail to live up to our expectations, is a fault their reality or our expectations? And so I think we need to avoid getting sucked into a bipartisan approach to Iraq which, in the end, blames it on the Iraqis and gets out.

Thanks.

MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I’m not sure if I would volunteer him to go before you. I think you should go first. It was an awful good presentation there.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM NASH: Well, that’s why – (unintelligible). I don’t need to say that much when I follow Jim. I must say, you know, we started off quoting Mark Twain – when I was listening to Jim talking about his three options of suppress, get out, or pick a side, I was reminded of Yogi Berra: you know, when you come to a fork-in-the-road, take it. And that’s the problem with that. We’ve come to the fork-in-the-road and there’s three forks, but we’re taking all three roads at the same time. We’re suppressing in Baghdad. We have a momentum to get out by, as Jim said, both the American population and the Iraqi population, which is building energy over time. But we’re trying to pick a side or we’re trying to balance the sides, if you will, and pursue a reconciliation. And that’s the reality of dealing in the world, I guess.

I would agree with most everything Jim said. I talked about broadening the course – the administration of staying in the course. I talk about broadening the course and that’s the regional approach and I would argue a global approach to dealing with the issue and I sometimes say that the solution to Iraq has little to do with Iraq anymore. It has to do with the region, it has to do with the global politics and the need to galvanize far greater efforts on the strategic level to deal with it.

But I want to – and the other aspect of that is the clarity of American objectives. We are going to leave Iraq – newsflash. Now, when and how – and as Jim talked about a phased thing – but making that clear and making this part of our strategy as opposed to a forced-by-somebody-else effort is, I think, important. I keep asking the question: what are our long term intentions for Iraq? Are we going to have permanent bases there? No. Well, then why are we building permanent bases there? We’re not going to have permanent bases, but we’re building permanent bases. So and that hypocrisy of words versus action is what continues to spiral against us in the region.

And finally – and we were talking beforehand and I attribute this to Jim – anytime a general says there’s no military solution, you’re obviously in trouble. I mean, he’s obviously not getting the job done for you that you’ve asked him to do. There is no military solution. But, General, we gave you a military job. The broader point of course is that it is politics, it is economics, it is social issues as well as security issues. And if you don’t deal with all across the board, you’re going to be in real trouble.

Let’s now go down to what’s going on. I would really like to tell you what we should have done. We could start in 2002 go to sometime in 2003, ‘04, ‘05. And here we are. So we’ve got to play the ball. The ball’s in the rough; you’ve got to play it. And I just – a few comments on what’s going on right now in the field.

In my view, the greatest import of the surge concept was an order to the American military forces to secure the population of Baghdad, okay? A clear, precise –and in the words of General Petraeus, security is a military term we understand. And “secure the population of Baghdad” – that is a clear, concise mission to do. Easy to say, but hard to do, I understand, but that clarity is the type of clarity we need to give our military in order to go about doing our business. And he has sacrificed his security in other parts of the country and he’s playing fire brigades in other parts of the country as he tries to deal with the issues in Baghdad.

And we’re going to go another couple of months and sometime in September he’s going to give an assessment. I’ll ask the question you already asked me so you don’t get to ask me now. I think sometime in September we’re going to get a report from General Petraeus was that we’re making some progress. The glass is about half full. We need some more time to pour the water in – in the jar, okay? And this is going to push out for several months after that. The rotation plans have been published that put this level of forces in country through the end of the year and we’re capable of sustaining it for some period of time after that. But if you’re going to secure Baghdad – if you’re going to secure the population of Baghdad, you need to do that. At the same time, you’ve got to work the political reconciliation issues and you’ve got to keep putting out fires in other parts of the country.

I can’t figure out Al Anbar. I keep getting reports that Al Anbar is making great progress, but yet Al Anbar continues to be a source of great trouble. One of the great commentaries I heard from somebody who is a very strong supporter of the war is – he says, the problem – one of the things we need to do in Iraq is build prisons. He says, did you realize that in the United States one out of 75 men are in prison? In Iraq, it’s only one out of 450. By God, their way to success is to put more in prison.

MR. ROEMER: (Off mike.)

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Okay. But the point is that as we work this, we are going to have to bring about the conditions that allow the people to go about their daily life, and if we can do it in Baghdad it could be the center of gravity, if you will, with progress elsewhere. Is that going to happen? I don’t know. The glass is not half full right now in my view. I think that we’re going to see a need to continue this high proportion of folks over there, this high number of 20 brigades plus or minus – well actually, plus two or three.

One of the things that’s happened is that as a result of the additional forces sent in the extension of tours, the base level is 20 brigades; there is in fact more than 20 brigades in country at any given time or will be as the year goes along. So they’re doing a rotation on top of the 20 and they’re not doing it within the 20 level and that’s a very important factor. There’s a lot more people in Iraq than they say is operating, but that’s because the rotation is taking place on top of the operational force, not as part of the operational force. That’s an important aspect.

And I guess we should say something about the support going to General Petraeus. This recent announcement of Doug Lute – General Doug Lute being announced as czar. I would just say that he’s a great soldier, great American, but he’s supervising some – one of the people he’s supervising used to be the war czar – the secretary of state – that used to be the war czar. So I’m just not sure that he’s going to be able to bring about the changes necessary to provide a coordinated government response and I would just look to some of those areas that Ambassador Crocker is responsible for as key areas that we need to work on.

And that was the biggest problem we faced in this success you talk about in Bosnia was that the ground force that we had there – it was (anymore ?) than Americans. Americans had about a third of force, but there were a whole lot of other folks there as well and we were able to suppress and we were able to stabilize while the longer-term political-economic efforts took place. And the security situation achieved a self-sustaining state, if you will, with very small contributions as years went by, as the momentum for the political-economic actions took place. And I think what we’ve seen in Iraq is that without that ability to suppress the insecurity, all of those political-economic actions have not been able to generate the momentum necessary. We’ll see if that can happen now in Baghdad over the next five months. And let’s talk about that.

MR. ROEMER: Well, let’s talk about it. You picked off all my questions. You anticipated every one of them, General. You did a great job.

General Abizaid said a couple of years ago that there was not a military solution here; there had to be a political solution. Given that we need a political solution, Jim, and given a lack of stability and effectiveness and sometimes competence of the government over in Iraq, how likely is it that we are going to see that stability lead to the kind of outcome you outlined in your third option.

And, two, if do they fall apart or if they do go on a three-month vacation in the summer time and if General Petraeus does come forward and say we’re making some limited progress, how do you do this without the political component in Iraq?

AMB. DOBBINS: Well, civil wars do eventually end and insurgencies also end either in victory or defeat or in some cases – rarely – in a political accommodation. So this will at some point end, but not necessarily anytime soon.

I think the prospects for accommodation among the parties don’t appear to be very good from what one can tell. The passions are high. The parties don’t trust each other and they don’t – and there’s no external actor that they can trust. In those civil wars and insurgencies that come to a negotiated conclusion – a conclusion which sticks, doesn’t eventually unravel almost always needs some neutral third party to come in and enforce the terms because whereas in an international conflict the two sides retreat to their own borders – they don’t have to disarm; they simply retreat to their borders or whatever borders they’ve agreed to. In a civil conflict, they have to disarm, and – because they’re going to live within the same borders.

And in those circumstances, if there’s a high degree of distrust, they’re not going to disarm unless there’s some guarantor whom they trust to protect them against the other side who may cheat. And that’s like peacekeeping has shown – in UN peacekeeping and U.S. and NATO peacekeeping – has shown a reasonable success rate in conditions where the parties are prepared to accommodate, but don’t trust each other and need somebody to oversee their implementation of the agreement.

There’s nobody who can do that in Iraq. The United States is too much party to the conflict to be trusted I think at this point as a neutral arbiter that the Sunnis and the Shi’as and – the Kurds would probably trust us, but I think the others would have more difficulty in trusting the United States to oversee the implementation of whatever agreements they might reach. Nor if the world’s only superpower is not in position to do it is there anybody else plausibly who offers themselves. It’s simply too dangerous, too difficult an environment to expect the UN or a peacekeeping force made up of Indians and Bangladeshis and Scandinavians to come in and do it either.

So the pessimistic assumption is that it’s probably not going to be settled by a political accommodation which is then implemented in good faith or under some kind of external guarantee. It’s probably going to get fought out over a longer period of time until one side or the other becomes exhausted. And if that’s the case, then I think the U.S. prime objective is to try to prevent it from spreading – try to ameliorate the damage it does largely by trying to reduce and redirect the external influence on – not just our influence but the influence of all the external actors in a way which ameliorates the worst aspects of the conflict and prevents it from spreading beyond Iraq’s borders.

MR. ROEMER: Bill?

MAJ. GEN. NASH: At the end of Desert Storm – I was an armored brigade commander in Desert Storm and shortly after the end of the war I ended up in Southern Iraq. I tell my friends I occupied Iraq before it was cool. And we got a bunch of the Shi’a, the marsh Arabs escaping from Saddam in the South coming through our lines, if you will, and so we had quite a few refugees gathering within my brigade area. One of the senior generals of Central Command saw me there and said, “Don’t build a refugee camp.” And I looked at him and nodded – I used to work for him – I nodded and said “Yes, sir.” I said, “I can do this organized or I can do this disorganized. Which way would you like it?” Then he looks at me and swore a little bit and said “Don’t make a permanent one.” You got it.

We’re leaving Iraq. We need to decide if we’re going to do it organized or we’re going to do it disorganized. And I think we agree if we do it organized, we have an opportunity to maintain a number of U.S. objectives and further our interests in a lot of different ways. And that’s why when I talked about clarity of objectives, I think we need a timeframe – not a timetable per se, but a timeframe where there is a clear commitment to this role. I think the times that have been thrown around this city are probably too short for good, orderly conduct –

MR. ROEMER: So what’s the reasonable timeframe?

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Two years.

MR. ROEMER: Two years. How many troops left?

MAJ. GEN. NASH: I think as you – assuming that the evolving Iraqi government agrees – the range of 50,000 as the sustaining training effort for a couple of years beyond that, maybe three years beyond that, and then a reduction down to a more normal – (unintelligible) – is not unreasonable and that can be planned and thought through.

Should we stay in the area? We’re going to stay in the area in the ocean. We’re going to stay with facilities in Qatar and undoubtedly Kuwait. Do we want to leave something in Kurdistan as an example? We could consider it, but I have reservations about permanent bases inside the territory of Iraq other than those directly associated with the training mission and the security for the training mission. And then I think we’re going to see – as we execute that plan, you’re going to see the political dynamics of Iraqi evolve over that time. You’re going to have to deal with that. And there may be a changing government, especially as an Iraqi government or an Iraqi army is professionalized. The dynamics can be very different than they are today and we’re just going to have to deal with that.

MR. ROEMER: And you’re confident that the Iraqi troops and security forces and evolving political nature will lead to stability rather than insecurity?

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Of course I’m not. Okay? Of course I’m not confident of that. But I’m also – Jim talked about the setting priorities. My priority is the national security interests of the United States, not the national security interests of Iraq. I understand the Venn diagrams overlap, but they’re not coincident, and so we have to think through, I think, how much we’re going to try to evolve. And Jim quite correctly – (unintelligible) –when our goals are modest but clear, we have a much higher probability of achieving them than if they are very broad and nebulous – okay? – and threaten neighbors.

MR. ROEMER: Jim, you also mentioned on talking to the regional people in the area, and the Iraq Study Group recommended that a long time ago – several months ago. I think the first talks with Iran are going to take place this weekend. Is that soon enough? Does it need to be just about Iraq and not about other things? How would you advise our government to negotiate, to talk – to bring Iran into this situation?

AMB. DOBBINS: Well, it’s not soon enough. It’s four years too late, but it’s better late than never. I do think that for the discussions to be meaningful they need to be sustained. They can’t be conducted under the scrutiny of the international media with each side giving long communiqués before they meet, after they meet, with verbatim descriptions of their exchanges over tea and whether – who went out the door first, which we’ve been getting lately. So you have to create venues and forums in which the interaction becomes regular and unnoticed in effect, and that’s why I’m skeptical. I’m a bit skeptical in sort of doing this in Baghdad, where neither ambassadors or policymakers – both of them at the ends of long leashes and they’ve got a lot of other problems that they have to cope with. So whether that’s necessarily the best forum for such a dialogue, I’m not sure.

It’s better than nothing and Crocker, who actually conducted discussions with the Iranians for a number of years, certainly is knowledgeable. I don’t know anything about his Iranian interlocutor. Personally, I would have centered the discussions in New York, which would have been a lot easier for both sides I think, but maybe this’ll lead somewhere else. I think that one of the reasons it worked well at the Bonn Conference was everybody was sequestered. There was no press. The thing was suppose to last a week. It lasted about 10 days and we ate our meals together. We slept in the same place. We took walks in the same park and for long stretches there wasn’t anything to do but talk and nobody was going to report on who you were talking to, so relationships could develop – a natural flow could develop.

And Dayton was in many ways similar. Everybody was locked in a U.S. Air Force base and weren’t allowed off and so the communication became more informal, more frequent, and in greater depth.

And I think – I don’t believe that just another conference on Iraq will get anywhere. There’ve been lots of conferences on Iraq. But creating a forum where you can have intense, sustained interactions over an extended period of time between people who are in a position to speak authoritatively I think is what’s necessary.

MR. ROEMER: Last question from me and then we’ll it open up to the floor.

General, we’re extremely good and we excel at winning wars. We are slow to learn the lessons of winning to peace. If Iraq does not go well in the ensuing six months or 12 months and it continues on a trajectory that it’s been on, how concerned are you about the lessons learned from this – that people in America might say this reconstruction and stability model needs to be thrown out? We don’t need to do it anymore. Wouldn’t you be very concerned about the trends of weapons and proliferation, failing states and terrorism, and that we do need to build good (unintelligible) on this one?

MAJ. GEN. NASH: We do. In the report that we’ve talked about that we did at the council on post-conflict in the wake of war – U.S. post-conflict capabilities – I made the point at the end and in the conclusion that post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction was conflict prevention done late. And I think as we approach the post- Iraq period of American history, is we need to do post-conflict reconstruction early. And we’ve got to get into the prevention business and we’ve got to get into the nation-building – the assistance to nation-building business, the creation of stability and development without invasion.

And the interesting aspect of it intellectually is the skills you need to do it after the war are generally the same skills as you need before the war. In other words, the ability to visualize the political, economic, social and security needs of a country to help that country create governance structures and provide goods and services to the people that they – and are representative those people, and that there is a rule of law and the rights of individuals are recognized, et cetera, et cetera.

Not all perfect. Not all we like. I mean, Jim made some disparaging remarks about some of the neighbors of Iraq. The fact of the matter is Turkey’s not all bad. And if we had that type of governance throughout the Middle East, we’d have a lot fewer problems than we have today. And I think that is a reflection of internal Turkish politics, assistance for many years, and other aspects of international development. So I think that that’s something we need to do. I’ve talked many times about the fact that we keep looking for nails out there so we can bring out hammers to work, and the fact of the matter is that our development assistance work probably should be the crucial aspect of American foreign policy in the post-Iraq period.

MR. ROEMER: The post-Iraq period. Let’s open it up for questions. Let’s come over here. Paul?

Q: Paul (off mike) with L.A. Times. For Ambassador Dobbins, I wonder how much progress could you really reasonably expect in talks with Iran given that we are, after all, setting about to create a coalition against them. I mean, could we realistically expect them to give up sending arms into Iraq? What kinds of things might they be able to do with us?

And for General Nash, I wonder, what do you think the Pentagon is up to with these permanent bases? Is this just kind of a bureaucratic impulse to pour concrete when the Army is there or is there some other agenda?

AMB. DOBBINS: I take your point that we need to prioritize in our relations with Iran and if securing a more cooperative attitude on Iraq is our top priority, then other issues have to be subordinated, at least temporarily, to that. Now, I think the administration would argue that the president’s January 10th rather tough message – sending an additional aircraft carrier, having Vice President Cheney go out and stand on the deck of the carrier and issue threats – that this was all designed to put us in a position of strength so we could conduct these discussions more effectively.

And I would acknowledge that that might work if it was accompanied by messages that indicated that there was a meaningful accommodation that was possible and that Iranian interest would be served by cooperation. But at the moment, I think you’re right to be skeptical that given the way both sides have positioned themselves in these discussions that either (would come?) ready to make those kinds of accommodations.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: I don’t know. I can’t explain to you that – I mean, on one side any commander, if he realizes he’s going to have forces committed to an area for six months at a time in very harsh conditions is going to try to create operating bases that are conducive to sustained operations. Okay? But at the same time, the specific objectives of this administration – long-term objectives of this administration I (unintelligible).

MR. ROEMER: Yes.

Q: Yes. Hi. I’m Barbara Slavin, USA Today. Hi guys. One more question on Iran for Jim Dobbins. Why do you think the administration is now finally having this meeting? Is it just because the Iraqis have been demanding it?

And also for both of you, the U.S. is building the largest embassy in the world in Baghdad – something like 1,000 Americans there now. Is this wise to have such a large footprint diplomatically and in a location close to (unintelligible) and are we setting ourselves up for, you know, helicopters off the roof of this thing?

AMB. DOBBINS: Now I forgot your first question, Barbara.

Q: Why are we finally sitting and talking about this? It’s four years too late.

AMB. DOBBINS: Well, the administration – this is not the first time the administration has agreed to talk to the Iranians. It’s the first time that both sides have agreed to time to each other at the same time. So there’ve been several sort of Alfonse and Gaston situations in which one side said they were ready to talk and then the other side said okay, but then by the time the other side had said okay, the first side had lost interest. So this is not exactly a breakthrough in terms of the administration’s willingness to discuss Iraq with the Iranians.

I think the administration is responding to circumstances for the logic of the situation and to the political pressures they’re under. It is true that the Iraqis, by and large, would like to see them have a better relationship with Iran, and so they’re under pressure from the Iraqis. They’re under pressure from American public opinion which, broadly speaking, supports dialogue even if it’s very skeptical about Iran. And they’re under pressure from Europeans and other – and the international community, who believe it’s important to engage the neighbors. And I think objective circumstances and the desirability of engaging the Iranians as our own position weakens has also made some headway as an argument within the administration.

At the same time, I think they still appear to be unable to prioritize and choose and unwilling to establish Iraq as a preeminent objective to which all others will at least be temporarily subordinated. And as long as that unwillingness to choose remains determinative, I think it’s going to be very difficult for these talks to proceed very far.

MR. ROEMER: General, why don’t you take Barbara’s second part of the question: helicopter on the roof and the embassy?

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Yes. I was hoping to –

MR. ROEMER: You were hoping that somebody else would get that one?

MAJ. GEN. NASH: No, I was hoping you’d be changing the film. (Laughter.)

(Cross-talk.)

MR. ROEMER: He’s had a lot of time for a sound bite here, Barbara.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: (Off mike.) My major concern – and it goes for the bases to the embassies – something like that – is matching word and deed. And the credibility of the United States is our most precious asset and it has suffered greatly in the whole Iraq escapade. So building bases, building big embassies is not the sign of not having long-term designs on permanence in the country, and that works against us.

Now, leaving aside whether – well, you know, it has anything to do with whether or not someday you will fly off of it, it has to do with creating a credibility with the populace that says your intentions really are good. No matter how you screwed it up, your intentions really are good. And I don’t think – we keep worrying about strategic communications, and that means seeing what USA Today published or what L.A. Times published today. Well, strategic communications is acting like you say you’re going to act – you know, it’s a consistency of word and deed on big-stage issues. And that’s where we suffer when we do bases and big embassies and hard-top roads, et cetera, et cetera.

MR. ROEMER: John?

Q: John Isaacs, Council for a Livable World. Ambassador Dobbins, you’ve talked about picking a side and helping it win even while reducing the number of troops there and the functions of those troops. What happens if we pick a side and that side starts losing or it loses? Do we then go back in or do we go – get out?

And that’s, in effect, the same question for General Nash: if 50,000 troops as trainers and it starts falling even further apart, what do we do then?

AMB. DOBBINS: I think you need to calculate your commitment. I think you need to continuously recalculate your commitment. You need to look at the costs and advantages of escalating or deescalating, so it’s hard to answer that question in the abstract. I would guess that is you made a calculation that you need to begin to reduce your presence both because it’s unpopular and because it may also actually be exacerbating the problems and increasing support for the insurgency.

You probably also implicitly made the calculation that if you had to choose between massively surging and getting out, you’d get out. But you’d rather have an intermediate option that isn’t quite as bad and preserves at least some of your interests. So the answer would probably be that you would withdraw entirely, but I don’t think that any prudent policymaker would make that decision in advance, and I think that the calculation would have to come at the point where it became necessary. I mean, governments don’t make decisions till they have to, and so governments never make contingency decisions.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: The worst thing that you could do or a lot of people could do would be to underestimate the ability of the United States to strike – to strike a foe. As we go about the process of leaving, if there was an organized force, and there was such a buildup of the insurgency that it started to transition from guerrilla to major combat operations to threaten the survivability of the Iraqi government, we could destroy that force very quickly. We could do it from bases in the United States very rapidly.

And that’s one of the things we need to remember ourselves and we need to from time to time remind those that might think that this – it’s great weakness (audio problem). We retain great power to strike anywhere, anytime, anyplace that we choose. And so that means that there should be limits on the ambitions of those who go against our interests as we go about this thing. If they get too big for the britches, we’ll take their britches off.

Q: (Off mike) Al Jazeera. (Off mike.) Two quick questions. One, how can you (divide?) the neighboring countries (off mike) respect for minorities? (Off mike) to look the other way if your side is committing ethnic cleansing or sectarian cleansing?

AMB. DOBBINS: I think those are all dangers. They are dangers that are inherent in remaining engaged in the midst of civil war. I don’t think you can become engaged in any civil war and not become associated with events that you would prefer not occur. I think that’s almost necessary.

On the other hand I think you can use your presence to minimize and reduce those kinds of consequences. I think one of the reasons to remain engaged, for instance, would be to prevent a Kurdish-Shi’a and Kurdish-Sunni conflict over Kirkuk, which would be a further complication in the civil war that would be quite likely if the United States left. In that case it would be a Sunni-versus-Sunni conflict, but if would be Arab versus Kurdish.

So I think that the answer is that the United States would have to accept the consequences, but also try to minimize and ameliorate them. And it would rationalize and present its presence, including to the neighboring Sunni powers, with the argument that it could get worse if we left entirely.

Now, in terms of kind of democracy you’re building – I mean, I think we are up against the demographic fact that Iraq is a majority Shi’a country and that any system of government that’s based on popular sovereignty is going to produce a majority Shi’a government. So, again, I think the United States would try to persuade the Sunni neighbors that Iraq is going to be governed by Shi’a – largely by Shi’as under any circumstances. It would be better if they were governed in a broader coalition that included Sunnis and provided them some degree of protection than to simply allow the civil war to drag on indefinitely, forcing most of those Sunnis to take refuge in Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Syria, which they’re increasingly doing, of course.

So the question is, do you want to help protect them in Iraq or do you want to build refugee camps for them in your country? And I think the United States would have to make the argument on those terms.

Q: But if you pick sides, you have to fight them (unintelligible).

MR. DOBBINS: I think you have to both fight them and also try to reconcile with them. And again, I think the U.S. would continue to do as it has been doing to try to promote reconciliation, to conduct dialogues with those Sunnis that are prepared to conduct a dialogue, while at the same time fighting them if they insist on fighting.

MR. ROEMER: Yes?

Q: My name is Joe Volk. I’m with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. (Unintelligible) appeared to have a problem definition that would be different than yours, where he, as I understand him, is saying, the problem is the U.S. presence in Iraq. And continuing the presence continues the problem. He’s probably overstating that a little bit (from?) the point. You seem to be saying the U.S. military presence is still a part of (unintelligible). So how do you – how do you persuade (unintelligible) the wrong problem (unintelligible)?

MR. DOBBINS: First of all, I don’t think a single source, single solutions to these problems are ever completely accurate, so there’s no doubt that the U.S. presence inflames the insurgency and increases support for it. And so the answer is that maybe a reduced presence would reduce that effect. And I am in effect suggesting that perhaps we should try a reduced presence to see if it does reduce that effect.

I’m also suggesting that a completely eliminated presence might have different effects which would be just as bad. Because while the insurgency might go away, the insurgency – the anti-American insurgency would go away, it would just be Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kurds killing each other without the additional factor brought about by the presence of American forces. So I think it’s a valid concern. I think that it is certainly a factor. All public opinion polling indicates that most of the Iraqis want the Americans to go home, including Iraqis that we’re doing our best to protect. I mean, the only population that doesn’t are the Kurds. The Sunnis, who – the Shi’a, who you would think would want us to stay since we’re essentially facilitating their securing control of the country via democratic forms would want us to stay. They don’t. You’d think some of the Sunnis, who now should recognize that we’re probably their last source of protection, would want us to stay. They don’t. So I think it’s a legitimate factor. I just don’t consider it the only factor that one has to take account of.

MR. ROEMER: General?

MAJ. GEN. NASH: In large measure I agree with Representative Murtha’s analysis, but that doesn’t mean, as Jim said, the absence of Americans will solve all the problems. I’d try to reconcile the two thoughts there as part of the – the organized departure, in other words. Because even the polling data of Iraqis that want Americans to leave – many of them say “but not right now.” Okay? Well, we’ve got to leave, but not right now. And it’s got to be an organized thing. It’s got to be part of a clear strategy – operation is really the word – the correct, technical word – to depart.

One thing on timing as you asked (unintelligible). And I’m now in your area of expertise in the world of –

MR. ROEMER: I’m not sure I have one.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: – American politics, but it seems to me that the window of opportunity for the United States to change directions will be brought about by the next administration, and that is a nonpartisan statement because I think this administration is trapped by its own rhetoric, by its own experiences, by its own legacy, if you will, and cannot make necessary changes – no matter how well intentioned – in the next two years – less than two years.

MR. ROEMER: Of course, the next administration may be trapped by the campaign, so –

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Well, that’s true, and that’s why we should think this thing through real careful as we work the campaign issues – is because the window of opportunity to make dramatic change to change the nature of the conversation about American foreign policy in general, about the Mideast in more specific terms, about Iraq in very specific terms is going to open up with a new administration. And that’s where you’ve got to think through this organized departure and then spend the time between now and then how to posture it and not get yourself tongue-tied on the campaign trail with positions that you can’t live up to for the good of the American people.

MR. ROEMER: And much depends upon those moderate Republicans that are left in Congress and how they reply to General Petraeus’s half full/half empty proposition in the fall.

Let’s go to Rand and then we’ll go back there and then Adam you’ll get the last question.

Q: Well, I’m perfectly prepared to accept the notion that there are a lot of acts that are occurring in Iraq that are terrorist actions, the administration argues that this is the central front in the war on terror, which I take to mean al Qaeda. I wish to hear both of you comment on that particular definition of this conflict since, Jim, you started by declaring this a civil war.

MR. DOBBINS: Well, I think that the term central front to the war on terrorism is a gross understatement unless you simply mean it statistically that there are more terrorist attacks underway in Iraq today than there are anywhere else. But al Qaeda is headquartered in Pakistan, not Iraq, and terrorists that are looking to strike at Western targets in Europe or the United States aren’t going to Iraq for inspiration or guidance. They’re going to Pakistan.

If there’s a central front to the war on terror, it’s in Pakistan and has been since November, 2001, which doesn’t mean that Pakistan should be next on the list for an invasion. (Laughter.) And indeed the whole –

MR. ROEMER: I’m glad you clarified that.

MR. DOBBINS: The whole concept of a, quote, “war on terror” is a misnomer if you’re dealing with what is essentially an organized conspiracy which has attached itself more or less like a parasite to an insurgency – a Taliban insurgency. And dealing with that problem should have been our top priority from the beginning.

But having said that, it doesn’t mean that there aren’t terrorists in Iraq and that some of them might not in some post-American withdrawal scenario go somewhere else and continue to do damage. But it seems unlikely that Iraq – Iraq certainly is not at the moment a locus for organizing, funding, directing terrorist attacks on Western facilities outside Iraq.

And while you could structure – you could foresee circumstances in which parts of Iraq might play that role, that would simply replicate the opportunities that are already available to the same people in places like the tribal areas of Pakistan, Lebanon, thePalestinian territories, and other areas that are ungoverned and semi-governed, including our favorite: Somalia.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: If all the “terrorists,” quote unquote, of Iraq disappeared instantaneously, we would still have the same problem with al Qaeda that we had in January of 2003. If they all disappeared in Pakistan instantly, we could take care of Iraq pretty quickly. It would not be as difficult (unintelligible) in Iraq.

MR. ROEMER: Yes?

Q: Can I ask the two of you to sketch out what you see as the one, two, or three most likely scenarios for the future of Iraq, assuming a fairly prompt U.S. withdrawal – something along the lines of a 12–24 months to a pretty nominal presence or maybe zero presence? We hear a lot about the best case and worst case, but what do you think is most likely?

MR. ROEMER: Jim, you want to start?

MR. DOBBINS: I mean, again, I think the most likely is if we just take the current trend lines and you extend them. So you’ve got intense fighting between Shi’a and Sunni. You probably have increased tensions between the Kurds and the Shi’a. You have competition and probably open conflict over Kirkuk. You have continued surreptitious involvement of most of the neighboring states and support of their favored faction. You have several million more refugees and you have increasing pressures for more overt intervention, for instance, by countries like (unintelligible).

MAJ. GEN. NASH: There’s no reason to think it will be nice. There’s no reason to think it will be anything less than an escalation of violence along the current trend lines that Jim talked about. That’s why we have to do this organized and we have to do it with a plan and with a vision that builds a national consensus in the Untied Sates that we’re doing something right, so there is in fact the unity in our effort. And then we, as part of executing our plan can work to mitigate extenuating circumstances for others, but with a primary concern of pursuing American interests. That doesn’t not necessarily mean things will be nice in Iraq, but it will be better for the United States’ security interest.

MR. ROEMER: Adam, are you all right? Peter, do you have a last question on Iraq?

Q: Yes.

MR. ROEMER: Okay.

Q: You’ve mentioned Tudjman and Milosevic as – in roles of peacemakers, something we seem to have not talked about for many years. It comes to mind Stalin’s role with our country in World War II. Who are the potential – you’ve mentioned Iran. Who else is a so-called evildoer or bad guy – or whatever vocabulary word it is this week – who are the other potential war criminals who we can deal with and possibly create some measure for peace?

MR. DOBBINS: Well, I think that the sort of al Qaeda element of the insurgency is probably not susceptible to negotiations. Their objectives are too sweeping to be accommodated in any reasonable fashion. I do think that the rest of the Sunni insurgency might well be able to be brought into some kind of settlement at some stage, but perhaps not anytime soon.

I do think that all of the neighboring states, but particularly those that have significant influence, which would be Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey, have important roles to play in securing the borders and using their influence with their surrogates inside the country to promote accommodation and reconciliation. It would be rather unpopular in this town, I think, to suggest that President Ahmadinejad is the new peacemaker in the region.

But you mentioned Stalin, and when Winston Churchill was criticized in the aftermath of the German attack on the Soviet Union for sending assistance to Stalin and attenuating his anti-communist rhetoric, and he told the parliament that if Hitler invaded hell, I’d make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.

And in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the Iranians in fact were very helpful to the United Sates in setting up a new government in Afghanistan, and unfortunately the administration wasn’t prepared to make a favorable reference to then President Khatami, who was a considerably more appealing figure. In the aftermath of the Bonn conference, Colin Powell sent a thank you note to every foreign minister who had a representative there except the Iranian foreign minister.

Q: Well, thank you.

MAJ. GEN. NASH: Assad, definitely Syria. The other thing and I just – make sure I said it – as the war was beginning in ’03, I had a representative of the administration explain to a number of us that the road to Jerusalem ran through Baghdad, and we all kind of (unintelligible) and says, no, no, no. The road to Baghdad goes through Jerusalem, that in fact – so the Hamas/Palestinian authority issue, the Hezbollah issue has significant impact on the mindset of the people that we’re dealing with in Iraq. It’s not going to change a lot of – everything, but it will impact.

So as we change the nature of the conversation, working the issues of Palesti