Nuclear Security Study Group Members' Meeting

Wednesday, December 5, 2007

On December 5th, 2007, Members of the Nuclear Security Study Group (NSSG) and their senior staff gathered in the office of Congressman Adam Schiff. Tim Roemer, President of the Center for National Policy, facilitated the meeting.

Outlined below is a list of issues that were considered in the meeting. The Members of Congress assembled, along with their staff, and agreed to an agenda for 2008 when convening as the Nuclear Security Study Group (NSSG). Input from other members of NSSG on defining the Group’s priorities and objectives are welcome.

In creating an agenda of issues, NSSG hopes to focus on one issue per each subsequent meeting. To ensure a free exchange of information and discussion, actionable ideas developed from the NSSG will be considered voluntary and will be attributed only to those who choose to implement the decision item unless it is otherwise noted.

Agenda for 2008

Keeping Nuclear Materials from America’s Shores

A series of agencies are currently involved in developing and deploying detection equipment designed to keep unauthorized nuclear weapons grade materials from America’s shores. The national labs at Sandia and other locations play a major role in developing and testing this detection technology. The national labs could brief the NSSG on the current availability of detection technologies and what resources they would need to improve detection capabilities in the future. The NSSG could raise awareness in Congress on the vital role played by the national labs in developing detection technology.

Accelerating the Global Threat Reduction Initiative

In response to the threat posed by highly enriched uranium (HEU) residing in research reactors and other sites of varying security in over 40 developing nations, the Bush Administration created the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). GTRI accomplishes its goal by sending in teams to de-commission reactors using HEU and physically removing the potentially weapons grade material to secure locations.

Progress in “locking down” potential nuclear weapons materials have been hindered by a lack of funds and scientific teams dedicated to the removal of the HEU. The 9/11 Commission Implementation Act recognizes the success of GTRI and its current limitations when it authorized “such sums as may be necessary to accelerate, expand and strengthen GTRI.”

The NSSG could explore ways to increase the number of teams able to secure HEU to live up to the legislative injunction to “accelerate GTRI” and pay international partners who agree to immediate shutdown of their research reactors.

Strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative

The Bush Administration joined by ten other original member states, created the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to halt illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. The PSI currently holds interdiction exercises on the high seas and has in a limited number of cases acted according to its mission in multi-lateral missions.

The 9/11 Commission recognized the importance of PSI by mentioning the program’s enhancement as one if its three recommendations on reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. The General Accountability Office has issued a report suggesting practical steps to increase the effectiveness of PSI.

The NSSG could recommend a series of steps for the Department of Defense to enhance PSI, such as allowing PSI to use the planning capacities of NATO and providing for annual budgetary line items for the program. NSSG Members could also monitor whether the Sense of Congress provisions related to PSI, as stated in the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act, are being implemented.

U.S. Coordinator for the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

The 9/11 Commission Implementation Act authorized the creation of an Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. The Coordinator is to serve as the “principal advisor to the President on all matters relating to the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.” The Coordinator is also tasked with formulating a “comprehensive and well coordinated U.S. strategy for preventing WMD proliferation” and set measurable milestones for agencies in achieving these goals.

The NSSG could outline the expertise it hopes the new Coordinator might possess and provide input to high-level Executive Branch officials to explore ways to ensure the Coordinator has adequate resources to accomplish his/her mission.

Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

The 9/11 Commission Implementation Act authorized the creation of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. The Commission potentially has a significant role to play on nuclear security policy. The purpose of the Commission is to assess current activities, policies and programs to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism and to give particular attention to securing all nuclear weapons grade material across the globe.

Congress has tremendous say in whether this Commission is able to live up to its promise, as the Commission’s membership is made up of Congressional appointees that are appointed on a bi-partisan basis. Funding for the staff and investigations is yet to be appropriated.

The NSSG could develop recommendations to leadership about the expertise such appointees to the Commission should possess. Members of the group could help guide the appropriations process by helping recommend an overall appropriation that would be required to achieve its mission.

The U.S. Relationship with Russia

Members of the NSSG could discuss practical steps they could take to encourage Russian cooperation in securing the 600 tons of nuclear weapons grade material still within the borders of the former Soviet Union and participation in operations to secure HEU from research reactors in their former client states. Members of the NSSG could consider initiatives such as placing these issues on the agenda of CODELS bound for Russia, raising these issues with the Russian missions in Washington and New York and encouraging the Administration to introduce these issues into a range of regular bi-lateral discussions.

Congressmen Fortenberry, Schiff and Holt suggested that meetings of the Nuclear Security Study Group take place on a monthly basis.