How to Fix Intelligence Oversight

Thursday, December 20, 2007

By Tim Roemer, The Washington Post

December 20, 2007

With the CIA's revelation that it destroyed taped interrogations of top al-Qaeda suspects, yet another intelligence scandal has exploded in Washington. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, this has become an all-too-frequent occurrence. When news breaks about potential misconduct in the executive branch, be it warrantless wiretapping, secret prisons or destroyed tapes, all eyes turn toward Congress's intelligence committees: Who knew about this? When did they know it? What did they do?

Part of Congress's job is to serve as a check against misuse of the great powers afforded to the executive branch, particularly in matters of war and national security. But trying to discern which committee members were briefed and what they did with the information misses the larger story: In their current structure, congressional intelligence committees are fundamentally ill equipped to effect real change.

Unfortunately for the intelligence committees, responsibility doesn't necessarily produce power. Unlike typical congressional committees, which are able to exercise power over the agencies they oversee, the intelligence committees are deprived of several tools because of the necessity of secrecy. Members of the intelligence committees cannot, for instance, leverage public opinion by alerting the media to executive branch foibles and failures since the information members receive is classified.

The intelligence-authorizing committees in the House and Senate -- the ones we look to when something goes wrong -- have, ironically, the least say over how intelligence dollars are spent. Instead, the defense appropriations subcommittees have final say over intelligence funding levels.

Authorizers are often circumvented or ignored by the intelligence community, which seeks to deal directly with appropriators. The defense appropriations subcommittees, understaffed and preoccupied with a $600 billion defense budget, simply don't have the time or resources to devote sufficient attention to intelligence funding -- one of the most important spending priorities for our country's national security.

Structurally, this split between intelligence authorizers and appropriators would hinder oversight in any context. But today the United States faces new transnational threats. Cyber-warfare, suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices present unique challenges to national security. Whatever one believes about the propriety of our intelligence collection programs, it is undeniable that the current environment has pushed us closer than ever to the legal and ethical edge. The sprawling powers the intelligence community acquired in the wake of Sept. 11 must be matched by proportional checks from the legislative branch.

So, what next?

When the Sept. 11 commission issued its recommendations for intelligence reform, we stated that ending "dysfunctional" congressional oversight of intelligence was among the most crucial steps the government could take. Unfortunately, our belief that strengthening intelligence oversight in Congress would be among the most difficult changes to achieve has proved all too true. Congress passed into law the commission's recommendations on intelligence reform, challenging the executive branch to a higher standard of performance. Our recommendations for congressional reform, however, have yet to yield similar progress.

The Sept. 11 commission recommended that Congress empower the intelligence committees by giving them the power of the purse in the form of appropriations. By combining authorizing and appropriating powers into a single committee, Congress would align responsibility with power. This would be a unique arrangement, as no other committee in Congress enjoys such power over the agencies it oversees. The nature of intelligence and the many hindrances of its oversight committees, however, merit a unique response.

Thus far, the House has taken a commendable step in the direction of reform with the creation of a House select panel on intelligence appropriations. Despite increased oversight efforts in its intelligence committee, the Senate has made no comparable move. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) and Evan Bayh (D-Ind.) have a bipartisan bill before the Senate that would fully achieve the commission's recommendation by granting spending power to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. If the bill is passed, the Senate would wield dramatically greater leverage over the intelligence community. Policymakers should be clear about what can and cannot be achieved by such reforms. Granting such powers to intelligence authorizers would not guarantee specific policy outcomes or prevent every scandal.

Previous Congresses complained, rightly, of an inability to achieve anything useful with the sensitive information entrusted to them. An intelligence committee with spending power would have the attention of the executive branch more than ever. It would be more responsible than ever for the intelligence community's successes and failures.

The Constitution enumerates Congress in Article 1, Section 1, as the first branch of government. Congress must have a first-rate system of oversight to balance the powers of the executive branch for the benefit of both branches and for the United States as a whole.

The writer, a former Democratic representative from Indiana, served on the Sept. 11 commission. He is president of the Center for National Policy.