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GRASSROOTS JIHAD? Mapping al-Qaeda’s Present and Future
In a wide ranging discussion, Dr. Marc Sageman explained his research on the profiles of al-Qaeda terrorists, explaining the contours of the new generation of jihadists (radical extremists) and the limitations they face.
Sageman, a former CIA intelligence officer and a forensic psychiatrist, first made news among counterterrorism experts with his 2004 book, Understanding Terror Networks. Sageman’s scientific approach to analyzing 21st century transnational Islamic terrorism cut through many of the assumed truths about terrorism, providing a clearer picture of who joins al-Qaeda, how and why.
Speaking about his latest work, Leaderless Jihad, Sageman explained how 9/11 and the subsequent global crackdown on terrorism have shaped the profile of the newest generation of international violent extremists. He described how the most recent converts to political violence in the name of Islam represent the “third generation” of al-Qaeda. The previous generations of al-Qaeda followers had their touchstone in Afghanistan, first during the Soviet invasion and later in al-Qaeda’s training camps under the Taliban.
The geography of radicalization today, Sageman argues, makes a fundamental difference in al-Qaeda’s ability to organize into an effective force. Where the provision of finance, training and support had given al-Qaeda’s leadership leverage over earlier generations, the increasing difficulty of providing such support after 9/11 has made the internet the primary, if only, source of contact with al-Qaeda for today’s generation of would-be terrorists. The decentralized, interactive nature of web forums where so much of radical Islamist interaction takes place, Sageman says, inhibits the development of coherent al-Qaeda leadership, leading the movement into disarray.
Significantly,
Dr. Sageman believes the tendency for fads to
recede across generations will
limit the appeal of radical Islam in the
coming years. “The young generation
defines itself in contrast
with the older generation,” Sageman said, and
argues that today’s youthful
expression of rebellion “is not going to be
considered cool in the younger
generation.
But the potential for jihad’s self-termination should not lull policymakers into complacency according to Sageman. He outlined a series of steps officials can take in order to hasten the demise of the al-Qaeda social movement. First, good community relations with local Muslim constituencies can help ensure that the images of Muslim suffering abroad don’t resonate with the experience of American Muslims at home. More importantly, though, Sageman makes a case for “taking the glory out of terrorism” by denying it the oxygen of publicity. Excessive press conferences, news leaks and official attention lavished on terrorism suspects gives al-Qaeda free publicity and strengthens their credibility among followers. If the United States minimizes al-Qaeda’s anti-Western credibility in the minds of its supporters, then, Sageman believes, policymakers can help speed its decay.