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More Talk Or More Tension? China’s Taiwan Initiatives And Implications For U.S. Policy

A CNP Panel on Cross-Strait Relations

Tuesday, June 14, 2005

Summary

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Transcript

Steinbruner: Good afternoon, everyone. Thanks for coming. We have a great program today. The Center has been focused on the cross-Strait issue for some time. I am certainly not the expert in the room, and I’d like to recognize the panel and thank them for being here today. We originally were going to do this program to focus specifically on the Chinese Anti-Secession Law, and we decided to wait to see how things developed. In the meantime, there have been some developments.

Most recently, I would point to the constitutional action in Taiwan and China declaring that it has the right to decide Taiwan’s future, and in a sense, Taiwan saying that it is up to the people of Taiwan to decide Taiwan’s future. So, there is the dilemma. How do we deal with these different points of views for some time? It’s interesting to wonder whether we are at a point where things are going to be easier in the future, or more difficult or just more complicated. And the possibility that it is the latter is what brings us here today. We have asked Tyler Marshall with the LA Times to moderate today. He has served four years in Hong Kong most recently, so he’s been out there and following developments closely.

Marshall: Thanks, Mo. Much as in Washington, even when you’re supposed to be focusing on Asia, you end up in the Middle East. I spent much of my time in Iraq even though I was living in Hong Kong. Last March the ASL was the latest spike in tensions across a 100 mile wide body of water that has been a focus of
U.S. security concern and attention for over fifty years. Those who study it call it the most dangerous place on earth potentially and as someone who has spent good chunks of time in Baghdad over the last couple of years, the idea that there is something scarier than that brings you up short.

I don’t have to explain to this group what we have. President Bush shortly after he came to office removed some of the ambiguity saying whatever measures are needed to defend this new and vibrant democracy on the island of Taiwan. On the other side, a rising China that is becoming an increasing economic power and is using that power to try to isolate Taiwan. The people at the Department of State, after grappling with “is China a partner or competitor,” now have given up. The last couple of briefings that I have had at the State Department, they just say, “This is a very complex relationship. This is a very complex country.” And so it is within that context that we are looking at developments today and what they mean for U.S. foreign policy at a time when at the highest levels of the current administration the focus has been elsewhere. What these developments mean, where they are taking us, and what it means for the future, and for that we have a really good group of speakers. We have Representative Steve Chabot, Republican from Ohio. We have Robert Wexler, Democrat from Florida. Both of them [are] representatives of the Taiwan caucus. We have Derrick Mitchell from CSIS who brings a Pentagon perspective from his time there in the late 1990s to 2000. And, Alan Romberg from the Stimson Center who served for many years in the State Department before going to the think tank industry. And last but not least, Representative Jim Leach. We are turning the program around where we will have the panel discussion first and then he will come in and give his remarks. Let’s start out with Congressman Wexler. I’ll ask each person to speak for 5-7 minutes, and then we’ll have a little cross-talk and then open it up for questions.

Wexler: Thank you very much. Hopefully, I’ll set the pace and stay on the short side of 5-7 minutes allotted. First, I’d like to thank former Congressman Roemer for being so gracious to invite me and Steve. Congressman Roemer distinguished himself as a member of the Congress as being exceptionally thoughtful, and he continues in that light as a member of the 9/11 Commission and in his current role at the Center for National Policy.

Let me, if I could, just share an observation or two. I’m not as expert as the members on the panel. I’ve had the privilege of traveling to Taiwan three times, China once, and I’ll be going again next month. When I first went to Taiwan, I had the privilege of meeting with President Chen, we had the idea to work in concert with Steve (Chabot) to create a Taiwan Caucus because we believed that there was a vacuum of people within the House of Representatives who could specifically advocate for enhanced relations between the United States and Taiwan. From my perspective, as important as that was, it was equally important to do that type of work, without it reflecting negatively on the American-Chinese relationship. And that I think is the dichotomy in which American essentially focuses on this as was referenced before as the most dangerous spot on earth.

We have one goal which will hopefully lead to the second. Our primary goal is to promote stability. The promotion of that stability will hopefully lead itself to an environment in which peace is possible between the two parties in a collaborative fashion. The last six months, have witnessed what probably at any other time in history, would be viewed as a series of extraordinary historic events. Unfortunately, those historic events will make a headline every so often but will essentially get left out of the papers. When you think about the idea of high-ranking Chinese officials attending a funeral in Taiwan or the highest ranking opposition officials in Taiwan visiting China and being treated like royalty. You never would have dreamed that probably two years ago. The idea that trade links would get stronger. The idea that there would be flights during the New Year. The announcement that China would permit tourism to Taiwan could potentially have enormous ramifications on the positive side for a collaborative effort by both of these governments.

The next step, which is really the most important from an American perspective, is encourage the venue for China to do for President Chen what it did for the opposition leaders. As important as the meetings were for the opposition leaders, we in America can appreciate that the dynamic is not nearly the same as meeting with the leader himself. And so I think our goal in the short term, the American goal, should be to encourage the venue…and the choice I think we will have is to encourage the two to meet bilaterally or whether it is better both for the U.S. and China and Taiwan, although I think Taiwan officials would probably prefer the bi-lateral meetings, to determine whether or not the United States should have a formal role in meetings between the leadership between China and Taiwan.

I would respectfully suggest that while the analogy of the cross-Strait situation as being the most dangerous spot on earth, there are many factors that would lend credence to that conclusion. But, on the other hand, where I think this area distinguishes itself from other areas on earth that are quite dangerous is that the actors that are engaged in this process I think for the most part act in a rational manner. It doesn’t mean that we agree with their actions or support them, but thankfully they have been rationally. But, when I look at the Chinese leadership and at times take exception with things that they do, for instance the Anti-Secession Law which I think was a disaster for China if you look at the way even Europe reacted which was to essentially take the same view as America. When you visit China and you realize that their most important goal for the Chinese leadership is to incorporate economically a great bulk of the agrarian based population. I think the numbers if I recall are that something like 200 million people must transition from an agrarian economy to a more urbanized economy. So, the Chinese have to create 200 million new jobs for a relatively young population to maintain and achieve the stability that they seek so desperately in order to insure their one party leadership. A leadership that has to create 200 million jobs for the most part cannot go around creating international crises to the point where you have American and Chinese forces at odds. I think President Hu knows better than anyone that if you are going to avoid the break up of China, if you are going to avoid the Sovietization of China, there must be stability. And I think that is something that works in the favor of stability and peace. That it would be entirely irrational for the Chinese regime, certainly the Taiwanese regime, to pursue a path that results in conflict. Because while the Chinese in theory might win that military conflict, I have no doubt that the jeopardy to their economic system would be so great that they may ultimately win that battle but lose the war. And I think that the Chinese leadership is rational enough to understand that. I started by saying that I would keep to my time, and I’m going to stop now.

Marshall: Thanks very much. From the Republican side?

Wexler: There was nothing Democratic about that. Except that it made sense.

Chabot: Thank you very much. I have to say, I agree with most if not all of what Congressman Wexler just said. This is one of the areas…let’s be frank, there is not a whole lot of bipartisanship in Congress these days, and arguably there hasn’t been for a long time despite the fact that we look back at the supposed golden years. I kind of wonder if the golden years were ever here. This is my eleventh year, but this is area where you really can see a considerable amount of bipartisanship, and Tim Roemer was an example of that, and I want to thank him for putting this all together because he was one who really did reach across the aisle and try to do good things for this country. And I do really appreciate his involvement in this. But, relative to Taiwan, there has not been a Democrat and Republican position on this. We have the Congressional Taiwan Caucus which was formed a number of years ago and has one of the highest memberships in the entire House. I think we are number two behind India and we are growing, so we may surpass India at some point. Although, we love the Indians as well. But, we are hoping to continue to grow and to work with Taiwan because we want there to be peace, but we also understand the threat across the Strait from the PRC and the challenges that Taiwan faces.

And, if I may, I’d like to add to the conversation my thoughts and observations about the situation on the Taiwan Straits. Specifically, on the US’ One-China policy. Over the past several years, I’m afraid I’ve seen America’s interests in Taiwan eroded by a thoughtless reverence for the U.S. idea of One China. Too many Americans, even high government officials, seem to think that One China somehow means that the United States accepts that democratic Taiwan is a part of Communist China. When I was in China a few years ago, we had the opportunity to have frank discussions with high ranking military officials of the PRC and a number of them were generals. And Taiwan came up repeatedly, and they essentially indicated that they felt that they had the right to use force to bring Taiwan under Beijing'’ control at any time, and they were pretty serious. They were convinced of the legitimacy of the use of force against Taiwan—a legitimacy that was based on their alleged sovereignty over the island of Taiwan. They seemed to think that because the United States has a One-China policy that we agree with their argument. So, I really came to the realization that Washington’s One-China policy might actually be encouraging China in its threats to ultimately take military action to resolve this situation. China’s leaders think that America already agrees that Taiwan is essentially a part of China and they think that American opposes Taiwan’s independence which we have said at many different levels. And for the Chinese, that’s half the battle. If the United States considers Taiwan as part of China, if the United States opposes Taiwan independence, then the United States must recognize the sovereign right of China to use force to effect the unification of Taiwan with the PRC. That’s basically the logic that they see. It may be impolite to say so but One-China I believe a dangerous fiction, but most of the international community has bought into to mollify China. Let’s face it. Every country sees China on the ascent; they want to be involved in trade which is sometimes beneficial sometimes not as beneficial to both sides. But nonetheless, they do want to mollify China and see them as the future. So, often times, their true feelings about Taiwan and their inherent sympathies get pushed aside. If we in the United States do as much as even acknowledge or take note of the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China as is laid down in the One-China policy, we adhere to a policy which poses dangerous ramifications for Taiwan’s security in my belief. If the U.S. would abolish its One-China policy and thus abolish its acknowledgement of China’s claim over Taiwan, there would be zero U.S. tolerance for Beijing’s use of force against Taiwan. All real and imagined ties between China and Taiwan would be severed. Today, Taiwan is being held essentially at gun point. Standing before a malicious bully who not only holds annual military exercises to simulate an invasion of Taiwan to subvert Taiwan’s sovereignty, but it continues to refuse to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, even to go so far as to announce the Anti Secession Law, as Congressman Wexler mentioned before, that essentially codifies into Chinese law the PRC’s right to use non-peaceful means to crack down on democratic Taiwan’s right to exist as a sovereign nation. China relies on the United States, not the other way around. And, as the world’s preeminent power, we cannot tolerate China’s threats. I have said many times before, I believe that the U.S. should abandon the outdated and irrational One-China policy. In my view, it is a relic of the Cold War. And the Cold War is supposedly over, and I believe it is. So, we do not need the one-China policy anymore. I hope that in the very near future we put it where it belongs.

And finally, let me mention to Taiwan, I have said this many times both there and here when we met with their officials here, I think it’s critical that Taiwan move forward as expeditiously as possible with its defense package, which it has had great difficulty getting done. But at last count I heard Taiwan had something like 600 missiles pointed across the Taiwan Strait at it. That defense package is critical. The greatest chance that hostilities will ultimately come about is if the PRC believes that Taiwan is vulnerable. And so they ought to move forward with that as quickly as possible. Thank you.

Marshall: Derek?

Mitchell: I know Congressman Leach is here, and you all want to hear what he has to say. I want to thank the Center for National Policy for inviting me, and for my colleagues on the panel for their comments. I look forward to hearing from Alan Romberg as well.

Earlier in the year, when I spoke to my Chinese colleagues, they outlined what their approach to Taiwan was going to be. And the slogan was, “sweet carrots and hard sticks.” And I think you can forgive some in Taiwan for wondering which is which. Because some of their so-called sweet carrots, I think to the Chen Administration, whether it’s the ASL or inviting the opposition leaders to Beijing, I think Chen wonders, “is this a sweet carrot or a hard stick?” I know I only have five minutes but the political outreach again. The opposition leaders coming. IS that an outreach to the people of Taiwan? Is that trying to say “hey, we are interested in dialogue?” Or, is that a way to promote a national front strategy that tries to divide Taiwan society, which is an age-old effort by China to try and insinuate itself into Taiwan’s society and undermine support for those they don’t like which in particular is Chen Shui Bian. On the issue of economics, they reach out to the South to the farmers. They say we allow greater free trade between the island and the mainland. Of course, the farmers are Chen’s main political support and those who had been in the past more ideologically nationalist and geared towards perhaps an independence minded DPP. So, is that outreach or is that trying to insinuate into Chen Shui Bian's political base? Is that a hard stick or a sweet carrot? Socially, they talk about opening up to tourists and having more from the mainland come over. That could be a very positive for the two sides. You hear them also talking about sending over pandas. You hear in the Taiwan media the term “Trojan Panda.” It has as much to do with Taiwan’s paranoia given that they are a small island dealing with a large China. But there are these questions of what are the intentions of Beijing as they pursue this strategy—this outreach—to Taiwan. And, of course on the military side, there is little doubt currently, I mean you hear it from Secretary Rumsfeld’s speech in Singapore and the upcoming report that is coming out of DoD which is somewhat controversial, but I think there’s not much controversy that China’s military modernization is moving forward very rapidly and it is based on a Taiwan scenario largely, and it poses some severe threats to Taiwan’s security and that has no abated even though some rhetoric from Beijing that they are thinking about a certain outreach or good-faith gesture to Taiwan the actions have not occurred. And that is the bottom line.

There are hopeful signs that Beijing is reaching out to Taiwan. And that reaching out to the opposition is the first step to reaching out to Chen and reaching out to those that they have opposed. But those hopes have not been realized. WE have not seen any real action that has followed. Even though I think that Hu Jintao is taking greater control of Taiwan policy, he has really made a step forward in breaking from Jiang Zemin, taking control through his actions and words, he may be tactically creative but they are not strategically different. And that is the real question: are they going to reach out and change the hearts and minds of Taiwan as the Americans and others have suggested he needs to do. That a truly peaceful approach means that you have to reach into the hearts and minds of the Taiwan people or is it simply a coercive strategy and grab their wallets and others parts of their bodies, and make them come along over time as they try to marshal their own forces and wait for a better time in the future. And I don’t think that China yet has done enough to prove that it is engaged in a hearts and mind strategy—that there is hope that as Hu Jintao as he gains more control of the policy can perhaps be more creative within his own system which is a fairly hard-line system. We see as well nationalism growing in China with regard to Japan. There is no reason why that nationalism does not mean things like Taiwan or the need to unify the nation in some way in the future. There are some roadblocks ahead to a strategy of real creativity, but I think the verdict is out as we move forward in the next several years on the China-Taiwan relationship.

Marshall: Thank you. Alan?

Romberg: Thank you very much. I want to join the others in thanking the CNP for staging this event. It’s a really important question. I frequently have said that the Taiwan issue is the one issue in the world that could lead to major power war. The U.S. could find itself in conflict in a lot of places in the world, but not with another major power and not over another major issue. In trying to think how I would structure what I would say in a 5-7 minute period, I came up with three major headings: 1. what are the basics? 2. What is the current situation? 3. What about the future?

Most people in Taiwan, speaking about the basics, would welcome independence but they realize that pushing for it risks all that they have achieved so they won’t. Instead, they will concentrate on preserving the current situation and avoiding anything that will foreclose their right at the end of the day to determine their own futures. The PRC wants reunification as soon as possible, but they realize that pushing for it risks all that they have achieved so they won’t. Instead, they will concentrate on preserving the current situation, and avoiding anything that will move in the direction of Taiwan independence and foreclose ultimate reunification. While individual Americans might have some notional ideas of what might be an optimal solution, as a government the United States has opted out of the ultimate shape of a cross-Strait resolution but remains deeply committed as a matter of strategic national interest to insure that the process is peaceful and voluntary. So it continues to warn both sides not to assume that the US will remain aloof if either one takes action to upset peace and stability and it has on occasion acted to back up that position.

The current situation: we have emerged recently from several years of uncertainty and 18 months of heightened tension in which both sides have taken steps that seemed highly provocative to the other. For most of this period, I would have judged that the initiative lay with Taipei. Their steps to deepen Taiwanese identity and strengthen Taiwan’s separate status from the PRC seemed also to portend a determined effort to push beyond Beijing’s limit of forbearance. Beijing responded with implicit and sometimes not so implicit threats to use force if Taiwan stepped over vague but nonetheless meaningful red lines. Both sides have stepped back. Taipei, from its possible crafting a brand new constitution that severed all links to the mainland. Beijing, from threats to use force to press reunification. So, what we now have is what I would call tentative but real equilibrium in which Taiwan promises not to move toward formal independence unless the PRC seeks to use force and the PRC promises not to use force unless Taiwan seeks formal independence. One important step in this was Beijing’s decision to seize the initiative first in the statement of May 17, 2004 and then in the so-called Anti Secession Law affirming its determination to block Taiwan independence but otherwise laying out a course that ranged from maintaining the current uneasy peace to something potentially much better. In parallel, Taiwan affirmed its commitment to continue to deepen its support for Taiwan’s dignity and well-being but otherwise laying out a course that reassured all concerned—not the least of which was the people of Taiwan—that it would not take the ultimate risk.

Looking ahead, the issue facing all concerned parties including not only both sides of the Strait but also the U.S. is how to assess the potential for actual progress in the period ahead and how hard to press for some achievements. I confess my own judgment is that we are most likely to witness several years when there will be neither a major breakthrough nor a major crisis, but rather a series of possible steps forward and some moments of difficulty and tension. While it’s not impossible that either or both sides could come up with steps that could facilitate more meaningful progress, and certainly people on both sides have given serious thought to do this, in light of the lack of mutual trust as well as the political constraints on all sides, we can not be optimistic. The news out of Taipei last night that the government is designating private organizations to work with the mainland on further charter flights and agricultural sales is a positive indication. But we can be sure that the course will not be smooth. Indeed, news at the same time that Taipei will insist on government negotiations to work out arrangements for great mainland tourism, as has already been mentioned, this news is an indication of the stumbling blocks that will beset any of these efforts coming from both sides.

As to the U.S. role, some have suggested a rather proactive stance. Seizing on the situation in the next year or so when the U.S., Taiwan, and the mainland will have generally stable leadership situations to urge cross-Strait dialogue, focused on reaching an interim agreement formalizing the de facto situation I described earlier: no independence for no use of force. I would be delighted if the two sides reached such an accord, but my judgment is that a formal agreement is likely out of reach and that the U.S. effort would more efficiently be directed at helping with steps that could contribute to stability within the current framework.

One key issue for the United States is to strengthen its overall relationship with the PRC so that mutual suspicions abate and mutual trust grows. Another key issue with the United States is the nature and letter of security relations with Taiwan. This includes both arms sales and other types of relationships designed to strengthen Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, while assuring all concerned that the U.S. neither supports Taiwan independence nor is seeking to establish a de facto alliance. Frankly, in this case, I think the U.S. can do better by sending consistent signals. More broadly, while it is my view that the current situation is fairly stable and all parties have a vested interest in not upsetting it, the emotions on the underlying issues are deep, the political forces strong, the potential for miscalculation not inconsequential, so the U.S. must continue to pay close and carefully considered attention seeking to deflect any inherently destabilizing steps while looking for opportunities to promote cross-Strait dialogue and exchange. Thank you.

Roemer: Tyler, thank you for keeping members of Congress under 5-7 minutes in their remarks. I am not sure I have ever seen that done before. You can see why Bob Wexler is often mentioned as a statewide candidate in Florida. Bob, thanks again and I hope you can stick around and listen to our next speaker. Steve, thanks again for your great insights and your hard work on bipartisan issues today and when I was in Congress. It was always an honor to work with you. Derek and Allen, thank you for putting out the description of sweet carrots and hard sticks.

I want to introduce a friend of mine from the Midwest, whom I deeply respect. He is a very cerebral and thoughtful member of Congress, and in addition to that, he is someone that you always like to learn from. He is always interesting to hear speak on various issues. He hails from the Midwest where we like to talk about common sense and working hard for our constituents. It gives me great pleasure to introduce to you the Honorable Jim Leach from the great state of Iowa.

Leach: Thank you, Tim. You were wonderful to serve with. I thought the panel was excellent as well, even though there were some different nuances in what each person was suggesting. What I thought I would do, is to give a little bit of a historical and then a current contrast about the Taiwan issue.

There is nothing more difficult than to attempt to put perspective on events of the day because many issues can only be understood clearly, if at all, with the passage of time.

This is perhaps particularly the case with respect to the subject matter under discussion this afternoon, relations across the Taiwan Strait and their implications for United States policy, which as this audience knows so well involves a set of enormously complex and intertwined problems, the management of which is central to the preservation of peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific.

Here, it is critical to review the history both of the breakthrough in U.S.-China relations that occurred during the Nixon Administration and the philosophical aspects of American history which relate to issues of a nature similar to mainland-Taiwan divisions today.

United States recognition of China was formally ensconced in a carefully negotiated communiqué and two subsequent understandings. The U.S. accepted a “One China” framework for our relations with the most populous country in the world. At the same time, the three Executive Branch initiatives were complemented by the Taiwan Relations Act, which establishes a commitment of the United States that no change in the status of Taiwan be coercively accomplished through the use of force.

While anti-communist, the party of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan had certain organizational attributes similar to the Communist Party on the mainland. And in one circumstance of philosophical consistency, both the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party of Mao Zedong claimed to be the governing party of all of China, including Taiwan. Hence, the Nixon “one China” approach did not contradict the nationalist positions of the old Kuomintang or the old and new Communist Party on the mainland.

The dilemma which comes to be accentuated with the passage of time is the question of whether Taiwan can legally seek today de jure independence on the basis of a referendum of the people. Here, there are contrasting models in American philosophy and history as well as security concerns for all parties to a potential rupture that must be prudently thought through.

Philosophically, Americans respect Jeffersonian individual rights approaches which may implicitly countenance revolutionary societal objectives. We also respect Lincolnesque concerns for national unity: a house divided, he noted from Scripture, cannot stand. It is in this context that America delivered a split judgment. The three Executive initiatives affirmed “one China” and the Taiwan Relations Act affirmed de facto, but not de jure, relations with a government of a non-state, one which was authoritarian in the 1970’s but democratic today.

From the perspective of the American government, there should be no doubt of the consistency of American policy. Under this President, as each of his predecessors – Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton – the governing American position is the acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is but one China of which Taiwan is a part. For U.S. or Taiwanese leaders to assert any other position would create an earthquake in world affairs.

The issue of Taiwan is unique but anything except abstract. It is conceivable that mis-steps of political judgment could, more readily than many suppose, lead to a catastrophe for Asia, the United States, and the world.

The precepts of “self-determination” and “independence” may in most political and historical contexts be conceptually almost synonymous. But these two precepts are juxtaposed on one place on the planet. Taiwan can have de facto self-determination — meaning the ability of a people to maintain a government accountable to its populace — only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty by the international community. To be precise, the Taiwanese people can have self-determination as long as they do not seek independence; if they assert independence, their capacity for self-determination will collapse with hundreds of thousand if not millions of lives becoming jeopardized. Hence, for the sake of peace and security for peoples of the island and the broader Asia-Pacific region, there is no credible option except to emphasize restraint.

Any unilateral attempt by either side to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is fraught with danger of the highest order.

As we make it clear to China that the U.S. is steadfastly committed to ensuring that the status of Taiwan not be altered by force, we also have an obligation not to entice Taiwan through ill-chosen rhetoric of “ours” on Capitol Hill or elsewhere in government into a sovereignty clash with China. Substantial Taiwanese self-determination can be maintained only if sovereign nationalist identity is not trumpeted. The ambiguous non-state status of Taiwan may be psychologically and aspirationally awkward for Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but ambiguity is preferable to sovereign clarity if the former implies peace and prosperity and the latter a ruinous war.

In this regard, there should be no doubt that Congress stands with the Administration in a common determination to fulfill obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. However, these obligations presuppose that Taiwanese leaders must understand the realities of mainland resolve and refrain from capricious actions that invite conflict or make constructive dialogue impossible. Just as a military effort by Beijing to unilaterally alter the status quo would necessarily precipitate an American reaction, a unilateral political effort by Taiwan to seek independence and dissolve all bonds with China would cause America’s commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to become inoperable.

Unusually, but profoundly, foreign policy options for the two great powers whose interrelationship will disproportionately determine the shape of the twenty-first century are constrained by discretionary statutes rather than negotiated treaties. That is why it is so imperative that we clarify our commitments and do nothing to invite decisions on Taiwan which may contribute to a societal suicide. Leaders in Taipei have heavy responsibilities to international order as well as their own people.

Beijing also has implicit obligations to world order. Yet it is amazing how so-called realists in government circles in so many capitals underestimate the “soft power” of people-to-people and cultural relations.

The past decade has witnessed a new maturity and sophistication in many elements of Chinese foreign policy. It has not been until recently, however, that more nuanced and pragmatic policy approaches have been applied to Taiwan. For whatever reasons – perceptions of the importance of the Taiwan issue to leadership legitimacy, growing Chinese nationalism, the role of the military in policymaking and internal communist party politics – Beijing all too often has appeared to be wedded to an uncompromising policy toward Taiwan, even when that approach has been demonstrably unproductive.

Symbolic of this approach was the passage earlier this spring by the National People’s Congress of an anti-secession law, which among other things codifies China’s threat to use force against Taiwan. The anti-secession law has been universally viewed on the island as a hostile, counterproductive act even though the premises underlying it reveal little that is new in Mainland attitudes.

Nonetheless, there is some evidence in recent months that a dose of pragmatism is returning to cross-Strait relations.

For example, in late April and early May KMT chairman Lien Chan and People’s First Party (PFP) chairman James Soong each made historic visits to the mainland. While each leader had a slightly different agenda, both urged a reinvigoration of cross-Strait dialogue. The Bush Administration termed the exchanges “promising.” Meanwhile, in a series of goodwill gestures, Beijing has said it will also lift restrictions on Chinese tourists crossing the strait, and has offered to cut tariffs on more than ten kinds of fruit grown in Taiwan. Indeed, officials in Beijing may have begun to read Joe Nye far more closely than officials in Washington, and in the soft diplomacy spirit have even offered Taipei a pair of pandas.

For its part, Taiwan has recently enacted Constitutional reform. The constitutional changes shrink the size of the Legislative Yuan by half, streamline election rules, and make it extremely difficult to pass any constitutional amendment calling for independence. Any future amendment must be approved by a three-quarters majority of the legislature, then be submitted to a national referendum requiring 50% approval by all eligible voters, which may help bolster cross-Strait stability.

On the other hand, for dialogue to be truly meaningful Beijing must reach out to the ruling leadership on Taiwan. In this regard, Beijing has recently hinted it is willing to disregard the past – i.e., President Chen’s independence leanings – if the future is defined by Taiwanese leaders as less philosophically antagonistic to its uncompromisable bottom line. Given the generally popular visits to the Mainland by opposition leaders, the analogy, if not specter, of Nixon has surfaced. If, as many assume, only Nixon could have gone to China – a proposition, by the way, that I don’t accept – it is possible that President Chen is in the strongest position of any Taiwanese leader to establish a new modus vivendi with the Mainland. In other words, Chen must be thinking through whether he wishes to be a Nixon or a Sharon; an Aaron Burr or a de Gaulle; or – most likely – simply his own man, struggling to establish what’s best for his people given the complex political hand he has been dealt.

While recent mainland initiatives are encouraging, my sense is that they may not go far enough. For example, instead of seeking to intimidate and isolate Taiwan, isn’t it in Beijing’s interest to be magnanimous toward the people of the island?

Shouldn’t it, for instance, shepherd Taiwanese membership in international organizations that do not imply sovereignty—such as helping Taiwan gain observer status in the World Health Organization?

Rather than continuing a counterproductive missile buildup, wouldn’t Beijing be well-advised to de-militarize the conflict by putting almost exclusive emphasis on culture and economics in its relations with Taipei?

And, in the defense field, wouldn’t it be in both side’s interests to upgrade communications, widen professional exchanges, and engage in confidence building measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental conflict?

There is an assumption among students of Beijing politics that no one in or aspiring to power in China can afford to be “soft” on Taiwan. Hence, given the proclivity for independence rhetoric within the governing DPP party on Taiwan, the risk that an escalation of rhetoric could trigger an irrational confrontation is anything but negligible. Likewise, mainland leadership may choose to precipitate a crisis. Singapore’s leaders, who follow trends closely in Beijing, even suggested last spring that China may be prepared to precipitate conflict over Taiwan in the next several years.

The greatest geo-strategic irony in world affairs is that the U.S. and China have a commonality of interest and are working together to resolve or at least constrain challenges associated with North Korea where the economics and politics of an isolated, rogue regime may ultimately deteriorate to the point of potential implosion. By contrast, it is Taiwan, a severely isolated island on which economics and politics have conjoined to allow more progressive strides to take place than any place on earth over the past generation, where the greatest prospect of great power conflict may exist in Asia.

Whether prospects of such a rupture are 50% or only 5%, they are too high. The human toll could be great; the rupture in trade and cultural relations devastating, causing impacts that could last decades after any conflict concluded.

In the final measure, all of us are acutely conscious that the 20th Century was the bloodiest century in world history. It was marred by wars, ethnic hatreds, clashes of ideology, and desire for conquest. Compounding these antagonisms has been the prideful miscalculation of various parties. Hence it is in the vital interests of potential antagonists in the world, in this case those on each side of the Taiwan Strait, to recognize that caution must be the watchword in today’s turbulent times. Political pride and philosophical passion must not blind peoples to the necessity of rational restraint. An emphasis on peaceful solutions to political differences is the only reasonable basis of future discourse between the mainland and the people of Taiwan.

Marshall: Thanks very much for those remarks. It’s too bad that Representative Chabot had to depart because in his remarks, he referred to the One-China policy as a “dangerous fiction.” You talk about any abandonment as an earthquake in world affairs. We have this status quo, but this status quo is moving. My question to you Jim and to the two experts is, at what point should the United States question the One-China policy and at what point should it?

Leach: Well, the United States questioning the one-China policy would not create the peaceful framework for moving forward. I think what’s in the interest of today is that One-China is strengthened. And this is happening. There are monumental events occurring right under our noses with the opposition leaders visiting Beijing. Now, historically, if you go back not very far, there has been an assumption that Taiwan (inaudible). Now it is the KMT that are embracing the One-China concept.

But, I would like to add a couple of things, if I may. The original communiqué was very artfully…written with great restraint. Nixon himself was more affirmative to Chinese interests. He was adamantly against Taiwan’s independence. This President has been very careful to urge restraint on Taiwan’s leadership and also very careful to convey to Beijing that we would consider it a severe breach to employ military force against Taiwan. I don’t think this Congress will do anything more than what the executive branch has done, whereas ten or fifteen years ago, that might not have been the case.

Romberg: May I just add a couple of things? I totally agree with the Congressman’s comments on China and that issue. I think there are a couple of areas where flexibility is possible. You mentioned WHO. I have been riding hobby horse on this issue for a while. It is not an issue that as it is currently constructed involves sovereignty. It seems to me that as Taiwan has been applying for observer status in the World Health Assembly, which is the executive arm of the World Health Organization, in my mind it is purely a political decision by Beijing—it is not a sovereignty decision. They could go along with that. They could even support it. And I think that during the SARS outbreak two years ago it would have been a terrific time for them to demonstrate that they can think more flexibly about this issue. So, I’m disappointed that they have not in fact done that.

The second thing is on the One-China question. I think the key here is thinking flexibly about the definition of One-China. I don’t think that the opposition political leaders in Taiwan having gone to the mainland are endorsing the PRC’s position on One-China, but they are saying that solutions are conceivable within the concept of One-China. And it seems to me that this is the kind of thinking that both sides need to engage in if they are going to find a way forward that is going to be peaceful and non-coercive and satisfactory to all.

Mitchell: Let me add to my endorsement of what Allan said and the Congressman. I should add as well that all of the Congressman’s talk I thought was really balanced and nuanced—sensational. He spoke as well at a conference that we did on Korea, and gave a lunch talk there that is also a model of nuance and statesmanship. So, I think that the Congress is blessed to have someone like him in Congress right now.

On the question of status quo, I mean there is a question of what is the status quo. And it gets to this point not of independence versus unification, but something in between that that I think creates a problem for the United States and others which is the question of Taiwan dignity. What is the appropriate place of Taiwan in international society given that Taiwan itself is changing? They are a nation now of 23 million people that have built their own political system, that have built their own economic system that are living certainly freer than the mainland. And therefore are seeking greater recognition of that achievement, and greater political space internationally. And this is not going to change, this is only going to get more difficult as Taiwan asserts itself in the international community. So when we debate over how we have to have a status quo and a push or provocation toward de jure independence, that’s all very true. But I think they key challenge is going to define what is the status quo given that things are changing across the Strait and in Taiwan. The WHO issue is emblematic of this where the isolation by the mainland of Taiwan is not only working at cross purposes to reaching out the hearts and minds of the Taiwan people but it is also unconscionable on the face of it. And the United States is really only one of two nations that supports Taiwan in the WHO—Japan being the other one at U.S. urging and on their own. We have to come to grips with this issue. Because what is dignified for Taiwan as it emerges in international society may be seen as provocative by the mainland and therefore induce some kind of aggressive approach and then people will say, “Who started this?” The fact is I think the trends are not very good on that front. The Taiwan people themselves are identifying themselves as Taiwanese not Chinese. If anything, they are Taiwanese and Chinese, so if anything they are drifting away socially. And how the mainland decides to deal with this issue and how Taiwan deals with the fact that they are undefined. I was there in 1989, and I wondered, “How can they live here?” If I were them, who am I? I don’t have a flag that anyone recognizes. I can’t go anywhere and people say, you are from X country. We are all proud to be Americans. There is a certain patriotism and nationalism that goes along with having a country. They can’t have that. They go overseas and they are undefined. How long does that last? And what does the United States to support what is what we should be sympathetic to which is a democracy that has developed that deserves dignity and respect internationally but that does run cross purposes to what seems to be an ossified mainland strategy to this point. Now, we’ll see if China truly decides to reach out with a hearts and minds campaign. But that’s going to be the key question as we move forward. Where that line is and whether we want to cross purposes with China, and our view of hearts and mind versus their view.

Marshall: Thanks very much. Any questions?

Question: My name is Harriet Fulbright. I have heard a lot of comments about U.S. restraint and hesitation on this issue. I was just going to ask what the mainland Chinese and Taiwanese expect from the U.S. or what they hope for?

Leach: I personally don’t think the U.S. can play a role in negotiations. There have been three exercises of United States’ force—two under Eisenhower and one under Clinton—in the Taiwan Strait. Expectations of that type of situation…(inaudible). I think the main expectation of the United States is that it encourage the parties enter into discussion.

And I want to say something on what you just said. We have this great bit of literature, “A Man without A Country.” And with Taiwan, we have a country-sized community with sovereignty. It’s an unsettling ambiguity, but I think it’s an ambiguity that the Taiwanese have come to live with. They are not that constrained in the world. Their leaders can’t visit certain countries, yes. But psychologically, I think they manage.

Mitchell: I don’t mean to suggest that I endorse Two-Chinas myself. I do fully endorse the One-China policy as stabilizing in the absence of anything better. I think both China and Taiwan see the U.S. as a vehicle of sending a message to the other. The Chinese are always saying, “Can you restrain Taiwan?” “Can you stop sending arms to Taiwan?” “Can you stop encouraging the separatists?” And then Taiwan saying, “You don’t love us enough. Authorize weapons for us…that we won’t buy. But say you love us by authorizing the sale of weapons. And constrain China and make them engage in dialogue with us without precondition.” So, to use us as a messenger to the other side, and what we say to both is that you need to talk to each other. And that’s the main message to China—no preconditions, just get together and talk it out between the two of you and we are ready to play a part if you would like us to, but we will voluntary abstain from that in the absence of acceptance by both parties.

Question: My name is Shelley Rigger. I had a question about the positive tone of today’s remarks, especially with respect to U.S.-Taiwan relations, which is a bit contradictory to a rising anxiety in Taiwan about how much longer the U.S. will tolerate Taiwan’s dithering over the arms sales package. And in fact, some Taiwanese journalists have asked me if I have gotten wind of a policy review in the offing to reconsider whether the good footing that US-Taiwan relations have been on for the last few months can be sustained in the long run in the absence of a purchase. What do you know about that? Are we headed toward hard-times with Taiwan if they don't pull the trigger on the arms purchase or is that kind of paranoia and unjustified anxiety?

Leach: Let me say first, the big picture is that for the first time Taiwan has said ‘No’ to what we have offered in military hardware. The implication is that they used to always ask for more than what we could give. In this administration, we have offered more than they are willing to take. I don’t look at this as any kind of rupture. I look at this as a difference in judgment. Certainly not a rupture. It’s an oddity, obviously, to have for further background the Chinese who are suggesting that no sales of any nature or substantially less. America is being asked by the Chinese to sell less and by the Taiwanese who don’t want to buy as much as we want them to.

Romberg: I think the impression that you got in Taiwan, Shelley, is obviously due to some statements that they at least think they have heard some senior officials say in some statements. “Well, if you are not going to buy our arms, we will have to rethink this whole relationship.” I think that’s an exaggeration by the people who are saying these things. I do think there is an issue here. What I tried to hint at in my opening remarks was that the message being sent by Washington on the arms sales is a bit mixed. And, as some people have characterized this particular package that is being considered as a litmus test in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Others in essentially the same institutions are saying, “Look, we are not wedded to this particular set of things, but what is a fact,” and I personally agree with this, “is that it is not a sustainable situation that the United States can care more about Taiwan security than Taiwan does.” And that that is manifest by Taiwan’s not just not purchasing this package but also decreasing its defense budget over a period of time. So, I think that there really is an issue. I agree totally with Congressman Leach. This is not an issue of some kind of break. That just doesn’t make any sense in terms of overall national interest. But I do think that there is some kind of frustration, and part of it is bureaucratic. Part of it is that Taiwan needs to face up to its responsibilities for handling its own defense in addition to its relationship with the United States. So I think that this particular package has gotten in the way of this, but the fundamental issue of Taiwan needing to take that responsibility I think is really quite real.

Mitchell: There is not much more to say than that. I think that Alan really hit the nail on the head with that one. Congressman Leach is obviously the authoritative person being in Congress because the Congress would be the one to make this a major issue or create a problem in the bilateral relationship if it were. It sounds like it’s not that...it has not hit that kind of critical point, and I would agree that that is probably the case. There is a lot going on anyway between the Pentagon and Taiwan. There is a lot on the bilateral front otherwise to help Taiwan with its own defense. It’s certainly in Taiwan’s interest, it’s definitely in our interest to pursue that relationship moving forward. And simply as our defense strategy, we need Taiwan to hold out for a period of time before the U.S. gets there if we decide to defend Taiwan should China attack. So, this is a very practical issue. It’s a very serious issue to defense planners, people in Washington as they look at Taiwan’s defense, but I would say that we have enough common interest that goes beyond this arms sales package that would obligate a rupture, and I think we also recognize the political realities in Taiwan that make this difficult.

Marshall: Thank you very much. I think this is about all we have time for. I think we have at least found some common ground that this is an extremely sensitive and emotive issue, and I think everybody agreed that the U.S. needs to stay engaged as a messenger and a facilitator to get the two sides to move towards each other and to balance what Congressman Leach mentioned our Jeffersonian and Lincolnian tendencies. Thanks very much to the experts as well. Thank you.