The New Bush Doctrine: The Wrong Path to Our Nation’s Security?

Thursday, April 20, 2006

A CNP Conversation With Diane Feinstein

Summary

U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) addressed the Bush Administration’s National Security Doctrine, which proposes a significant change in the approach to how America responds to the world. Senator Feinstein, a member of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, will offer an analysis and critique of this approach, and will raise concerns about its potential impact on American security.

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Transcript

Senator Diane Feinstein: Let me begin by saying thank you to Leon (Panetta). There are really few people I respect more than the man who introduced me. He is known for many things, among them always having a wonderful smile, even during the most difficult times. And then, of course, as a member of the House, as Director of OMB, as Chief of Staff to President Clinton, and now in the private sector. What I want you to know is how much I respect your commitment to public service.

And thank you, Maureen Steinbruner, for the invitation to speak here today.

To my mind, of all the myriad challenges facing the United States, none is greater than national security. In the wake of the 9/11, the White House has articulated a new, and in many ways, revolutionary approach to U.S. foreign policy. As a result, today, I believe that America’s national security stands at a decisive crossroad.

Much of what the Administration has done since September 11th to safeguard U.S. security interests has been necessary and its been right. I have supported President Bush in these efforts.

But given the very serious and potentially explosive crises we now face in Iraq, in North Korea, and in our war on terror, I believe we should take a closer look at what the Administration has been developing by way of its policies which are meant to take us far into the new millennium.

Specifically, the Administration’s focus on unilateral action, its reluctance to embrace international law, treaties and institutions, and its apparent emphasis on military power to the exclusion of other policy options, have created serious concerns, I believe, both in our own country and abroad. And its actions have lost much of the good will the United States generated after 9/11.

This unilateral approach and strategy stands in sharp contrast to a successful bipartisan tradition born out of the Second World War – a tradition of supporting a world ordered by law, with capable international institutions and reciprocal restraints on action.

And, in the long run, I very deeply believe that this new strategy undermines U.S. security and will make the world more dangerous, not safer.

It is interesting to note that this current strategy has little in common with candidate George W. Bush, who spoke eloquently about the need for America to conduct itself with humility in international affairs during his campaign. I recall well the 2nd Presidential debate, and I was really struck by this statement:

"If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us; if we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us. And our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power, and that's why we've got to be humble, and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom."

Now, of course these words were spoken prior to 9/11, and clearly, today, the world is a different place and terror presents a set of unprecedented and complicated challenges. But these challenges point to the importance of coalitions and allies working together with multilateral alliances.

And yet, in its first two years in office, this Administration has reneged on more international treaties than any previous Administration in history, including:

walking away from the Kyoto climate change treaty,
ignoring the still-unratified Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
pulling out of negotiations on enforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention,
scrapping the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and
recanting the U.S. signature on the Rome Treaty to establish the International Criminal Court.

I want to confine my remarks today to four specific documents put out by the Administration during the past year. These are:

the Nuclear Posture Review, which was put out in January of 2002;
the Doctrine of Preemption, which the President first really broached himself in the commencement address at West Point in June of last year;
the Administration’s National Security Strategy, of September 2002;
and then National Security Policy Document 17, which the President signed in September of 2002.

Nuclear Weapons

In January of 2002, the Pentagon released a document called the Nuclear Posture Review, and despite subsequent efforts to downplay its significance, it is, in my view, extremely provocative and dangerous.

The bottom line of both the classified and unclassified versions is a blurring of the line between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons, and the suggestion that certain events might compel the United States to use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear states.

The Review specifically discusses contingencies whereby the United States would engage in a first use of nuclear weapons. These include "a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan."

And the Review addresses contingencies in which the United States might use nuclear weapons – not in retaliation for a nuclear strike on the United States – but to destroy enemy stocks of chemical or biological arms. It calls for the development of a new generation of U.S. nuclear warheads, including low yield or so-called "mini-nukes."

Just yesterday, at a Hearing of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, I asked Energy Secretary Abraham whether Secretary Rumsfeld had been quoted correctly in The Washington Post, on the 20 of February, when he said that the Administration had no plans to develop new low-yield nuclear weapons.

Secretary Abraham said yes, he had been quoted correctly, that they are only studying adaptations of existing weapons. Yet the Nuclear Posture Review states that "new capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats....Development of these capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new systems to address these challenges, are imperative...."

This seems a clear indication that although Secretary Rumsfeld may have been narrowly correct when he said to The Washington Post "I don’t believe there is anything currently underway by way of developing new nuclear weapons," the Nuclear Posture Review states differently.

At the same time, the Nuclear Posture Review expands the countries included as possible targets, mentioning that "North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies…"

Although I would not defend any of these regimes, with the exception of North Korea, none are nuclear powers. These "contingencies" really point to a first use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state.

And, in September of last year, a National Security Presidential Directive, known as NSPD 17, reversed the long-standing policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding United States use of nuclear weapons. Previous administrations of both political parties, when faced with an uncertain world, have made ambiguous public statements about the United States reserving the right to consider "all options" without any specificity as to which options, or under what conditions.

But together, these two new policy initiatives cite contingencies for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons or the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation to a non-nuclear attack.

I believe that such an approach is not in our nation’s interest, nor is it consistent with our standards and values. A first use of nuclear weapons by the United States should be unthinkable, and responding to a non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons violates a central tenet of just war and U.S. military tradition.

There is no question that in the post 9/11 era a full range of policy options for dealing with new and uncertain events should be on the table.

But in my view, nuclear options should not be considered as an extension of conventional options because this inevitably lowers the threshold for use.

So, if the United States is seeking to develop nuclear weapons which blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear forces and lowers the threshold for the possible use of these weapons, we must consider the message that this sends to the rest of the world.

I believe that it is critical that the United States sets a very high international standard for nuclear restraint. If we do not, we may well encourage others to develop their own standards and their own nuclear arsenals.

Today, both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, and the history of bloody warfare between them presents a major and ongoing security threat to South Asia.

If these countries were to follow the thinking embodied in the Administration’s new nuclear policy, why would India and Pakistan not seek to integrate nuclear weapons even more into their own contingency plans – and possibly use them?

Indeed, at a time when the United States brands as "evil" certain countries based, in part, on their pursuit of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction, we must be especially careful in how we consider our own options and contingencies regarding nuclear weapons.

Today, North Korea has withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled IAEA inspectors, reopened the Yongbyon facility and is developing other nuclear facilities as well.

It has moved 8 thousand plutonium rods out of storage into a reprocessing facility for nuclear weapons, and has, most astonishingly, publically revealed that it intends to defy all comers and to continue to make nuclear weapons and the systems to deliver them. In essence, nuclear weapons may well become North Korea’s only cash crop. They could purvey them throughout the world if left to their own devices. They possess the weapons systems to deliver them. The Taepodong 2 may be able to reach Alaska, and a yet untested Taepodong 3 may be able to hit anywhere in the United States.

And, most recently, Iran has announced it possesses an indigenous supply of fissile material, namely uranium. How many others will follow? If we are not careful, our own nuclear posture may well provoke the very nuclear proliferation activities we seek to prevent.

The Doctrine of Preemption and the National Security Strategy

In his commencement address at West Point in June 2002, the President called upon all Americans – and I quote: "to be forward - looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives....If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long."

This theme was further developed in the National Security Strategy, published in September of last year, which argues that: "the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past...."

It goes on to say: "We cannot let our enemies strike first....The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves."

On their face, I agree with these statements. I believe that in fact there are situations where the United States, confronting an imminent threat, may have to strike first. However, by creating a specific preemption strategy, and by adapting the concept of "imminent threat" to threats not "fully formed" or to cases where, one day, a foreign government may be a threat to the United States, we set a precedent for others – which may well come back to haunt us.

In fact, this thinking may well lead to a less stable and a more dangerous world.

What lessons are others to draw from our words and our actions?

For instance, the Administration has stated that one of its top foreign policy goals is to create conditions in which China, 15 to 20 years down the road, is an integral part of the world community and adheres to international law and norms of conduct.

But what lesson is China to learn from the policy of preemption and the Nuclear Posture Review which set up the contingency for possible nuclear attack on China, if it were to use military action against Taiwan?

The Administration’s decision to deploy missile defense and to preempt, when combined with the lower thresholds for nuclear use, could well spur China to further expand its nuclear arsenal, which has been stable at anywhere from 18 to 24 ICBMs. As you know, China has expressed a strong "no first use" policy. It is clearly not in America’s interest to see this policy changed. This is this kind of scenario I find deeply troubling and to which the policies of our government, which I just cited, may lead.

Conclusion

By moving the United States sharply away from the concept of cooperative security and a world governed by international law and established norms of behavior, and potentially substituting unilateralism and preemption in its place, I believe that the Administration’s policy runs the real risk that the United States will become increasingly isolated and alone, and overly dependent on its military might to protect its interests and its citizens.

If we follow the paths outlined in these four documents, we may well provoke what we want to prevent: and that is, a world in which no nation is bound by treaties or international accords and in which might makes right.

Since World War II, our country has embraced international cooperation, not out of vulnerability or weakness, but from a position of strength.

Indeed, a signal accomplishment of U.S. policy since World War II has been the rejection of isolationism and imperialism, and the development of alliances with other nations as partners, not satellites.

No matter which of today’s many crises represents the biggest threat, the United States is much more likely to be successful in dealing with them – and safeguarding our own national security interests – if we are able to act in concert with our friends and allies.

Today, the United States, as we all know, is the greatest military and economic power the world has ever seen. Its global influence is unmatched. There is no question that we have the capabilities to protect our interests overseas. But America’s overwhelming power still leaves us vulnerable to asymmetric attack, and, increasingly, many people around the world see a United States that does not listen and imposes its will on others.

So we stand at an important point in the history of our nation and of the world: Will the United States turn away from the successful bipartisan tradition of supporting a world ordered by law, and pursue, instead, a unilateralist path?

Or will we recommit our nation to the achievement of workable democratic structures for international law and international institutions, norms of behavior and conduct that others are willing to accept.

I deeply believe that this Administration is heading into uncharted territory, without adequate reflection or consultation with Congress or our allies. And so, it is time to raise the warning flags.

As we set a future course for this nation, as we face a variety of threats and challenges to our freedoms and our lives, we should remember that the hallmark of success of America’s national security strategy flows from who we are, not just what our military can do.

Our strength also emanates from our moral stature and our beliefs in truth, in justice, and in freedom.

Yes, we must be vigilant in our war on terror, just as we must compel Saddam Hussein to disarm, and convince North Korea, Iran, and others to desist in the pursuit of nuclear weapons. If the mission in Iraq is really disarmament, then why not give inspectors the time to accomplish this. With this course, Saddam is both deterred and contained, as he has been for 12 years.

If the long-term goal of our foreign policy is to help build a world where we have more allies than adversaries, more friends than enemies, and more prosperity than poverty, a doctrine of unilateral preemptive action will most certainly work against that goal.

So far, we have not crossed the Rubicon – the voices of reason and restraint can still prevail. What happens, I believe, over the next several weeks and months could well define how this nation is perceived for generations to come.