Printable Version
The United States, China, And The Taiwan Strait: Clear Skies Or Stormy Weather Ahead?
A CNP Cross-Strait Forum With Randy Forbes, Ike Skelton, Jim Kelly, and Kurt Campbell
October 27, 2005
Summary
Congressional and policy panelists at a CNP forum on Capitol Hill flagged the need to address China's increasing military investments as a challenge for U.S. policy makers seeking to maintain a healthy bi-lateral relationship and ensure stability in the Taiwan Strait. House China Caucus co-chairs Randy Forbes (R-VA), Ike Skelton (D-MO), former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Jim Kelly, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell called for new bipartisan attention to the U.S.- China relationship in general, while emphasizing the continued importance of Taiwan's status as an issue for both sides.
Transcript
Maureen Steinbruner: Good afternoon, and welcome to this Center for National Policy forum. We brought together this very distinguished panel today to take a look at the state of U.S.- China relations, with a particular focus on the issue of Taiwan.
Today’s Washington Post had a column by Robert Novak datelined Beijing. The headline reads, ‘Is China a Threat’?
So, this is a very timely discussion. But, we aren’t here to ask a stark either-or question like that. We want to explore some of the concerns that have been raised about China’s military posture and procurements, and to look at that in relation to Taiwan’s military readiness. We have asked our panelists to first give us their individual views, and then we will have time for questions.
We are very pleased to have Randy Forbes of Virginia, a Republican, who is trained as a lawyer as is his colleague Congressman Skelton. He served for several years in the Virginia assembly, as both a member of the House of Delegates and then as a Senator, where he held leadership posts and was active in sponsoring important legislation in a number of areas. In Congress, he serves on the Armed Services Committee, where he has been an active advocate in support of a strong and effective US military.
His colleague on my left, Congressman Ike Skelton, has represented the Fourth District of Missouri since 1977. He, too, of course, is a lawyer – we were just chatting about that – and is also a leading specialist in the House of Representatives on defense issues, highly regarded for his expertise and commitment to national security by members on both sides of the aisle. He is ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.
Congressman Forbes and Congressman Skelton Co-Chair the new bipartisan China Caucus and I hope they’ll say a few words in their remarks on how that Caucus got started and what its purposes are.
Here on my right immediately is Jim Kelly, a Senior Adviser and Distinguished Alumni at the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington and also in Hawaii. He most recently served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs under President Bush. Jim has a long and distinguished career in government, focused on the Asia region and national security having served in the White House, at the Pentagon, as well as at State. He served in the US Navy from 1959-1982. He and I actually met for the first time in Taiwan on a delegation.
Kurt Campbell, on my left, is Senior Vice President and Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Studies, also at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. We could have done this downtown at CSIS but we’re here. He, too, has served in senior posts at the NSC, at the Pentagon, and also served as an Officer in the US Navy. He is coauthor of “To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism” and coeditor of “The Nuclear Tipping Point.”
With that, I’d like to turn to the panel and begin with Congressman Forbes.
Randy Forbes: Thank you, Maureen, and let me just first say what a delight it is to be here, and I’m honored just to be on this panel with my good friend, Ike Skelton, for whom I have such great respect and friendship, and also with Mr. Campbell and Mr. Kelly.
What I would like to do is just kind of give you an overview of where I see Congress right now, and some of the issues that I see that are confronting us and then get in to some more specific questions as we go through.
Maureen raised the topic of the China Caucus. Back in January of last year, Ike and I had the privilege of going to China and traveling there. And I think – although it’s not the most articulate way of phrasing it – when we concluded that visit and sat on the plane, probably the phrase that was used by most of our members would have been “uh oh.” We recognized that, while we had been focusing on so many areas of foreign policy around the world, China had kind of emerged. It didn’t [inaudible] happen that way; it emerged as far as our observations were concerned. We came back and the more we studied and looked at it, we were kind of amazed that there was no caucus; there was no clearinghouse for China issues that had ever been established in Congress. And so, he and I established the China Caucus which has just exploded.
Our purpose for that Caucus was not to be pro-China or anti-China. It was because, as we looked around, there was no clearinghouse; there was no place where you could come with such a multifaceted area such as China and say, ‘we’re going to look at it from a multifaceted approach.’ Every place that we looked seemed to stovepipe it, and they would have it pigeonholed. So you would have somebody who would say: ‘well, we’re looking at trade, and we’re very pro-trade and we don’t want to ask any other questions’; you would have somebody else who might look at it for defense and say, ‘we only want to look at it for defense.’ We were concerned that, when you look at China you can’t put it in a single box. Anybody that comes and tells you ‘threat or friend,’ they miss China.
China is a multifaceted country. It’s a large country and there are a lot of issues. I was talking to Maureen before we began, we’ve had people come to us on the Caucus and say, ”what’s your position on this issue or another issue?” And we’ve had to tell them: “Position? We haven’t even formulated all the questions that we have to ask yet.” So what we have tried to do is to be an objective caucus, to do an analysis. The problem is that we live in a press world of 11 second sound-bytes, and where the press loves to put you in categories. If you realize that all that glitters is not gold, and you just say, ‘we need to ask some questions,’ all of a sudden they’ll say you’re hawkish. And that would be like going to buy a car and if you dare to ask what the price is, you’re a cheapskate. We think that these are questions we have to ask because what we don’t want is to have policies relating to China that are going to be knee-jerk reactions, or watching this pendulum that constantly swings back and forth.
Let me just give you some observations of what we’ve seen. One thing that is very clear - I mean if we debate a number of issues - the government of China knows far more about us than we know about them. When you go over there they know our elected leaders, they know our process, and many of them speak English as well as any of us do.
When you come back over here you find that very few people in the United States really have an understanding of China, and very few people in Congress have an understanding of China. That’s why we felt that we needed to look and say ‘what are the positives?’ Well, we all know that when you look at 1.3 billion people and the opportunities we have for trade, for cultural exchanges, for technology growth between the two countries, they’re great. But also, we want to explore, ‘well, what about this $162 billion trade deficit?’ What impact does that have not just on us economically, but what impact does it have in terms of allowing the Chinese government to purchase weapons systems, for example? We know that a few years ago, when they would go to purchase weapons systems from the Soviets they were using IOU’s. Today they’re primarily using American cash.
The other thing that we have been very concerned with is this huge military buildup that we’ve seen taking place in China today, concerned because of the lack of transparency. And we’ve shared this with leaders over there that, when you have a lack of transparency, and when you’re talking about two leading countries the size of China and the United States, misunderstandings can develop. Misunderstandings can lead to missteps; and missteps between countries like China and the United States are something we don’t even want to think about.
We’ve also looked at concerns with dual use technology. What questions do we need to be raising from that? We have raised with them the normal concerns you have with human rights, also with intellectual property. Because, as you know, they have done very little in terms of enforcing intellectual property rights, and our caucus has tried to put pressure to try to say, ‘that’s something that we could do very quickly, we could step up to the plate and deal with.’
And we’re trying to also study – hopefully, we’ll have time to discuss – what’s the impact going to be on the new energy consumption needs that China has? When you look at a country that their growth will be 800,000 barrels per day, this year, compared to the US growth of 140,000 barrels per day, that’s a huge driving force in China. When we were there, one of the things we were surprised with was that businessmen came to us and said, ‘we want to buy a billion dollars worth of coal from the United States this year.’ Huge pushes for energy.
And then if you overlay that with the “one child policy” which, as you all know, has created a huge discrepancy between the male and female populations, that’s something we need to at least examine and say, ‘what impact is that going to have, not just on their domestic policy, but on their foreign policy as we go down the road?’
The last two things that I will just tell you are: China seems to have a plan for everything. We may disagree with the plan. It might be a good plan or a bad plan but they have a plan. Contrast that to us in the United States. Oftentimes, we do not. Perfect example: shipbuilding. If you look at what is going on in China today, they’re very, very smart. People in the United States think ‘oh, they just bring a lot of cheap labor and build the ships.’ [Inaudible] No, that’s not true. It’s high-tech. They bring their steel plants to where they’re producing their ships. They can build a tanker ship in six months, from start to finish. When you look at the United States and ask ‘where’s our shipbuilding plan?’ we don’t have it.
And the last thing I’ll just share with you: one of the things we have come to recognize as the most crucial thing we can do is to create [an entity and] mechanism on a government level somewhat akin to Goldwater-Nichols where we begin to bring people from agencies together to formulate plans on how we can influence our relationship with China over not just a 6 month planning period, but a five, ten, and fifteen year period of time so that we won’t be in situations where we have to ask the very question that Maureen raised, “Is China a Threat?” We think that question, itself, is a dangerous threat if we have to begin answering those kinds of questions.
So, I’m looking forward to your questions today, Maureen, as we go through and thank you for allowing me to be here.
Steinbruner: Thanks very much. And just to restate, that was Robert Novak’s question.
Forbes: Yes, that’s right.
Steinbruner: Thanks very much. Congressman Skelton…
Ike Skelton: I hate to begin by correcting or lecturing the moderator, but, Maureen, its Missourah not Missouree.
[Laughter]
Steinbruner: My apologies, truly!
Skelton: Actually, if you’re from the St. Louis area it’s Missouree. Thank you very much, though.
I really have to give credit to Randy Forbes for being the idea and the spark that initiated the China Caucus with [inaudible] with him to help put it together and it has taken off quite well.
Members of Congress, because of proximity - whether you’re on the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, or other committees – will, from time to time, have conferences, or meetings, or Congressional delegations to Europe or, in more recent days, to the Middle East, and not that many go to the Far East or, in particular, China. But we did this past January, and it was an excellent trip. There is a tyranny of distance and – for those of you who have traveled to the Far East understand – when you get there you’re really pretty well worn down, and it’s difficult to do business unless you have a day or so to rest in the process.
But it’s interesting when you speak about China, Randy, being [inaudible] for you or I. I well remember China being our great ally during the Second World War. I remember the Communists and the fight, the political question thrown at who lost China in 1948 and 1949. In the middle of the Korean War when we were up on the Yellow River the Chinese army came in and lengthened the Korean War for several years. And it wasn’t until Richard Nixon went to China in 1972 that relations began to thaw, and there is a continuous thawing going on today.
I think one of the problems we’ve been having, as Randy said, we just don’t know that much about that country and it’s really, many things inside one. I hope I’m right on the figures I’ve been given, but there are 140,000 Chinese studying in this country. We have all of 2,000 Americans studying in China. Even if the figures are off a bit, that gives you an idea of the fact that we have not academically or intellectually prepared ourselves to learn about that country. And, at best, it’s a very complex country.
I’m convinced of several things: that the Chinese are very patient people, and that they think in long term strategy. We Americans with fast food, and all that goes with it, look more for instant gratification, that’s just the way we are. By contrast, China has a number of serious challenges ahead of it: a population that’s considerable (1.2 billion), the economic challenges they have ahead, of course they have a very large poverty problem there, they’re a growing military power – I’m convinced that the figures that were made public can probably be doubled or tripled with what they’re spending in the military area.
For the short term basis I think that there is a serious challenge regarding the Taiwan Strait. I am convinced that the most dangerous spot in this world today is not the Middle East; it’s the Taiwan Strait. A miscalculation or the wrong thing said at the wrong time, at the wrong place could ignite problems there that we hope don’t come to pass.
Secretary Rumsfeld spoke about mixed signals regarding Chinese words and actions. And I think it would behoove us, not just because we’re in Congress, but behoove us as Americans to take a good hard look and start learning about that country. Is it inevitable that we have conflict with them? No. Is it inevitable that there be a Taiwan confrontation? I don’t think so. But I think it’s going to take a lot of patience on our part, on everybody’s part, to work together.
In the area of military investments, China is purchasing very sophisticated SAM [surface to air missile] systems. China’s investment – large investment – in submarine construction is causing us to take a hard look at that. I spoke a few moments earlier about the tyranny of distance, and the distances will always be there. Of course, China is closer to that part of the world than we, and, as a result, the tyranny of distance does not work favorably for our future.
I hope that, in the days ahead, level heads will be able to bridge the gap between Taiwan and China, and that we can work better toward an economic trade balance, that we can have better military-to-military understanding. I think that’s very important because, like it or not, military people have their own language, regardless from which country they’re from. I think it really boils down to a matter of determination of Americans in Congress, in academia, government-wise, business-wise, to learn about that country, to learn to work with that country so that our interests will be known, and be paramount for the betterment, not just for Americans, but for that part of the world, as well.
I look forward to the discussion. It’s a pleasure, Maureen, to be with you, and I know you will always remember the lesson in how to pronounce the state which I represent.
Steinbruner: You have to show me because I’m not from Missourah. Thanks for that correction and for your remarks. Jim Kelly…
Jim Kelly: Thank you, Maureen. This is the first time I’ve ever looked out from this direction in a committee room in this building. Even for an hour or so it’s a tempting process, but I don’t think either Mr. Forbes or Mr. Skelton have to worry about political ambitions in my case. We’ll let Dr. Campbell speak for himself.
The topic for today was to be the US, China, and the Taiwan Strait, and whether there are clear skies or stormy weather ahead. Mr. Skelton noted that briefly. I think I would just say that, as with this very day outside, the skies are mostly clear but there are some gathering clouds. And as we’ve seen on the East coast of the US, some years you get a lot of storms, and some very intense storms that are unexpected and can cause some damage. I think that’s pretty much the reality in the Taiwan Strait, as well.
It is important, though, I think, that we note that when it comes to the policy of the United States of America, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of China or Taiwan, itself, there has been an enormous amount of consistency over the last seven American presidents who have all thought, after careful inspection, that a policy of engagement with China is important. What we have been able to do so far – and there are not ultimate guarantees – is, I think, to have an effective relationship with China and to maintain an essentially healthy and unofficial relationship with Taiwan during the years since the normalization in 1979 – a great deal of credit for that needs to go to the United States Congress.
Those who remember back to 1979 at the time of the normalization of the relations between the US and the PRC, there was a tendency to really sweep Taiwan off the table. And the Congress said, “Whoa, let’s stop and think about this.” And they enacted a piece of legislation, the Taiwan Relations Act, that has stood for some 26 years with no changes at all during that time. I would argue that it is more important now than it has been over these years because this established very clearly, in particular, into words - which some can challenge as not meaning enough, but the fact is that all of those involved know they do have a great meaning - a sense of grave concern about forcible attempts to put pressure on Taiwan.
I would point to two documents that I think are particularly relevant. US policy towards Taiwan and China was articulated in some testimony I gave pointing in the other direction in a not so far away committee room, before the House International Relations Committee in April of 2004. This was a very carefully worked on statement of American policy at a time when many in Taiwan wondered, ‘is this thing being changed’? A few months before, people in China had been saying, ‘is the US changing its direction?’ We tried to spell out in pretty clear terms where things were. And I think this still represents the policy of this government and this administration.
It was updated, in a sense, just a month ago. Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick, in a speech in New York not really focused on the cross-Strait issue but focused on the larger sense of the relationship of the United States and China, gave an important articulation of policy. Among other things he rejected specifically the notion that China should be contained by the United States or others. He also rejected the notion that the US could or should assemble some sort of alliance in Asia of countries that would join us to oppose China. He noted that that was an army that was unlikely to have many recruits, and it was a policy that wouldn’t work.
He noted the strengths in this relationship but also spelled out the enormous risks that are there, particularly with the incredible economic growth that China has experienced and the great impact that it has had on pursuing essentially a policy of export-led demand with the US as the recipient of so many of its exports. What we had last year was a $162 billion trade deficit which will certainly be exceeded for 2005. This is absolutely unprecedented in history. As Mr. Forbes mentioned, there are intellectual property concerns and a host of items that need to be considered.
And then on the military side, too, there is this lack of transparency. I think some of the questions that Maureen asked – ‘Is this a military buildup that needs to concern Americans?’ Yes, I think it does raise some significant questions. Some of the writings of, in a few cases, recently, not so obscure Chinese military figures very properly raised concerns with the US and others in the region. This has not been a transparent military buildup. Yes, it is true that, as China’s economy develops, as it becomes more of global power, it is going to be involved in modernizing its very un-modern old armed forces. But the directions that are being taken have got to be of concern to those in Asia and to those in America who watch this.
With all of this complexity and the host of issues: energy has been touched on; the environment and the limitations that environmental concerns that have been put on development in China; when and how is this going to crash? People have been predicting economic crashes in China for over 20 years and they’ve been wrong time, after time, after time. Maybe someday they’ll be right, but it’s a question that’s worth asking. And so I’ll end my remarks now.
Thank you.
Steinbruner: Thanks very much. I remember that April 2004 speech, very carefully crafted, indeed. Dr. Campbell…
Kurt Campbell: Thanks very much. I actually do like the view from up here, but unfortunately my farm is in Representative Forbes’ county so not very good timing on my part.
Let me also take a moment to join Congressman Skelton to just say I want to commend Congressman Forbes. This is a wonderful idea. It’s the right thing to do at the right time. And I think we all appreciate that.
I also want to thank my friend, Jim Kelly, for his service for many years to the United States government and to welcome him back to private life. I look forward to having phone calls returned. Or maybe not, though?
[Laughter]
If I could – we’ve heard some very good discussion about US-China relations – I’m going to give you my framework and then try to answer specifically some of the questions that Maureen and, very usefully, the Center for National Policy has put on the table.
I think, after 15 years of uncertainty about what’s going to be the major challenges confronting the United States over the course of the next generation, we’re seeing some clarity finally. And I think one facet of a twin threat that is emerging is now quite clear: we’re going to be facing a long, generational struggle with Islamic jihadism. Even though we have now transcended the initial anxiety of the September 11th period, I think those challenges are going to be with us for the foreseeable future. And they’re morphing in ways that I don’t think we fully appreciate or understand. In fact, when we think about the challenge we think mostly about the Middle East but the reality is, as Jim Kelly or others will tell you, some of the most delicate challenges with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism are in Southeast Asia and, indeed, in China.
So, I would say this is a global phenomenon, one that we don’t yet fully understand, one that is going to tax us for a longer period of time. I also think that while before September 11th the links between al Qaeda and Iraq were limited or uncertain. There’s no doubt about where we are today. Iraq is fully, fundamentally woven into the fabric of jihadist, fundamentalist terrorism. And if we don’t prevail in Iraq it will turn out to be the single most devastating setback in the history of American foreign policy. So, that’s the stakes that we’ve got here. So, we’ll either prevail here or this will go down in history as a black mark on all associated with it. And that’s just the reality.
The problem is that concurrently while we’re involved in this extraordinarily epical, dangerous, long term set of challenges, concurrently we have a challenge that we have not devoted attention to, and I agree with Representative Forbes. Over the last ten years or so we’ve seen an extraordinary rise in the East. China’s power has risen more dramatically across more sectors than anyone would have anticipated -- to the point now, I would argue, that the dominant player in Asian politics today is not the United States but China.
If you go behind the scenes in military venues, in diplomatic gatherings, in commercial interactions you find that most countries regard China much more significantly than they regard the United States. But, by any aggregate measurement, the United States is still a great power. And, frankly, because Asians are so polite they often don’t tell this to Americans, and they certainly don’t tell it to traveling administration officials. They talk quietly about anxieties about the United States not focused on what they view to be the drama that’s playing out in the Asia-Pacific region.
Now to their credit, the folks that labor at the working level, the Assistant Secretaries, have done a marvelous job. The scarcest resource in American foreign policy is not just money and troops – although certainly we have challenges there – it is the attention and the mindset of the senior-most administration officials. And for very good reasons, the Middle East has taken up the lion’s share of our attention over the last several years.
It reminds me a lot of the story that I read my daughters – I have young daughters and I read Snow White to them. And there’s that point in Snow White where the queen goes up to the mirror and says, “tell us who is the most lovely person in the kingdom,” and one day the mirror says ‘well, it’s Snow White,’ and the queen is shocked. We’re a little bit like the Queen, but no one really has told us yet of some of the dramatic changes that are underway in Asia.
Now, the fact remains that, I would argue, much of this is based on extrapolations about China’s future that we can’t predict. And the tendency that the United States has had with every challenge that we’ve faced over the last 50 years – whether it was the Soviet Union, or Japan, or now China, or even Islamic terrorism – is that we tend to exaggerate certain capabilities and national assets of countries we oppose. I agree that there is much to commend China. But do they have a plan for everything? No. Are they ten feet tall? No. Do they have an unemployed or underemployed population in China that is larger than the population of the United States? Yes. Do they have enormous social problems, huge problems with energy, and an unrepresentative government, and enormous problems that play out on a daily basis? Yes. Would I project that those problems would bedevil China in the immediate future? I think that’s most likely.
However, the fact remains is, because of what China has accomplished over the last decade, they are enormous players on the international scene, and they will continue to be big players. And one of the good things about this Caucus is to help redress and help shift back some of that focus towards urgent challenges that are confronting the United States and our friends in Asia, as a whole.
I would argue that we are coming to the end of the first phase of the twin challenges: of both the war on terror – the so-called war on terrorism – and our engagement strategy towards China. I think everyone would agree that the first phase in the war on terrorism we focused too much on military power. And we now have to focus on a more nuanced strategy that engages more moderates in the Islamic world. We have to bring more of our friends back inside.
The most alarming thing I have seen in the last five years is the demise of American soft power. The new Pew poll suggests that, in every country in the world, China – an authoritarian, relatively brutal regime – has more attractions and positives associated with their style of government and their style of international diplomacy than the United States. That’s shame on us. Shame on us. I think we’re coming to the end of this first phase of the war on terror and, hopefully, we’ll be more nuanced.
I also think we’re coming to the end of the first phase of engagement strategy toward China. We talk about engagement as having two elements. One is commercial engagement and clearly we have succeeded dramatically in many areas – although, frankly, there are some areas that are certainly not a fair balance sheet or playing field. But also, China has risen more rapidly in terms of manufacturing and certain aspects of the economy than any of us had anticipated. The other element of this is, of course, the hedge: our forward deployed military capabilities in the Asian-Pacific region.
And there I’ve got some concerns: I think we’ve taken some steps on the Korean peninsula; I think we’ve had to reinforce a little bit in the Middle East; and I think it has caused some countries in Asia to raise questions about whether we’re going to remain engaged in the way that we have been for generations in the Asian-Pacific region. And I look forward to the Bush administration and others making the point about the United States as, “here to stay here to play.” I think Rich Armitage, Jim Kelly, and others have been important advocates of that position.
Well, let me just, if I can, just conclude with a couple of points going forward. I would say that the issues that worry me most about China are not just its military capabilities. That’s what we’re going to focus on, that’s what we’re going to think about as we go forward. I have a whole set of other issues that make me more anxious.
I think what’s great about the Zoellick speech – and by the way the audience for the Zoellick speech was more the United States, he’s speaking to us more than anyone else. The biggest problem that we face in the formulation and execution of China policy is not China, and, indeed, it’s not even Asia, it is divisions in our own polity. The divisions on China policy are more elaborate and, at times, vicious than almost any other issue that we face inside government. And these dilemmas, ironically, are not between the parties. They’re really not so much between the Republicans and Democrats, they’re inside the parties. And they’re most vicious inside the Republican Party. And so a national dialogue with you two leading a partnership is a very valuable thing because it helps us put issues on the table. When we are as divided as we have been on China policy – and, I’m afraid, here I cannot commend the Bush Administration, too much division on these issues – then, I think it makes it difficult to enter consequential messages.
One area where I really must commend the Bush Administration, which Jim has said, is the messages we have sent about what we expect across the Taiwan Strait. This is one of the biggest successes of Bush administration foreign policy and it is due to just a couple of people working behind the scenes: Jim Kelly, Rich Armitage, and a few others. And so because of that, I am actually not as alarmed as about the Taiwan Strait as I was in the past and I really commend the Administration for how they’ve handled these issues.
The other issue that I worry about, however, is that there are a number of efforts underway in the multilateral realm in diplomacy in Asia in which, and I put it diplomatically, China is eating our lunch. They are convening meetings; they are interacting in ways that suggest we’re not as actively engaged as we should have been. One of the fairest criticisms that occurred during the Clinton Administration was that President Clinton decided to go on this long trip to China and not stop in Japan. Absolutely accurate.
The Bush Administration has just done something similar in which Secretary Rice did not have the time to go the ASEAN regional forum -- only a couple of months before this major event that’s being convened in Malaysia that excludes the United States. We cannot, in a way that makes sense and that’s understood by Asian friends, argue that we need to be included in these meetings if we don’t have the time to go to the scheduled meetings that are already on the docket. We need to do more. They are long flights; they are difficult, long trips. Goodness knows Jim and I have done a few of those. But for us to be big players in the big game we need to do more of this going forward.
The last issue is the one that actually worries me the most: the fact is that neo-cons get a bad name. They are a small group, highly organized, extraordinarily effective, and they have basically dominated the foreign policy agenda of the United States of the last ten years in many important ways. And I would say that they, more than anyone else, a small group of 20-30 people, have steered the United States in the direction of the Middle East. I was in a meeting a couple of weeks ago with a very prominent group of folks who, in the past, when we had gotten together, had spoken almost exclusively about Iraq and the Middle East. Lo and behold, in this meeting, these guys were not talking about Iraq and the Middle East anymore, they were talking about China, and they were talking about China and Taiwan. Now, one of the great things about neo-cons is that they know when real estate starts to go bad, and when it’s time to address new issues and get out in front of an issue and stay on the attack.
And the fact of the matter is that there are a lot of people that are talking about this coming military challenge vis á vis China. China is not the Soviet Union and the reality is that there’s going to be many areas that we’re going to be able to cooperate with them and we should cooperate with them. And there are some areas where we’re going to be forced to compete. But it’s going to be a much more nuanced relationship than those folks suggest. And we have to have the confidence to be able to stand up and explain that in a way that makes sense on both sides of the aisle. And try to develop a bipartisan consensus on the way forward.
I’ll just conclude by saying that because we’ve decided to do what we’re doing in Iraq – and I’ll be honest, I was a supporter of that – but that has required enormous capabilities, capabilities and resources that we did not anticipate. And we have to be honest with ourselves. We may not want to be honest about it politically but in our hearts we appreciate that. And that means that we need to make trade-offs going forward. We have no choice in the struggle with Islamic fundamentalism. That struggle is with us, we’ve got to take these guys on.
The fact is that our relationship with China is not preordained, and that China has a lot to say about the future of how this second twin challenge plays out. And so one of the challenges of our diplomacy is to do everything possible to make clear to the Chinese that working with them is the best possible way to deal with the war on Islamic fundamentalism. And that if they prevail, if the Islamists prevail, it will be not only bad for the United States but it will be bad for China as well. Ultimately with that kind of consensus, I have more confidence that: Taiwan can live in peace, and can prosper, and can continue to democratize; that the United States and China can work together on areas of common consensus; and that we, together, can deem that the region, which is enormous, is big enough for the both of us to live, prosper, and work together in peace.
Thank you.
Steinbruner: Thanks very much. A lot of stuff on the table here. I think I’d like to start by asking the panelists if you’d like to comment on anything someone else has said.
I’d like to just, maybe, start – I’m going to turn this over to the audience in one second – let me ask you, Kurt, to talk a little more about the implications of your last comment, if I may. If I understand what you’re saying, you’re suggesting that as we, perhaps, are entering a new phase of our relationship with China – beyond the early engagement phase – is it your sense, across a range of issues that we perceive as high priority, such as the war on terror – that engaging with China on these issues per se will help or, beyond help, actually take off the table some of the difficulties over things like the Taiwan Strait?
Campbell: I have to say again – Jim raised the Bob Zoellick speech which was one of the best speeches on US-China relations we’ve seen in a long period of time, it’s a little overdue but it’s a very, very powerful and good speech. He raises the idea of a stakeholder, that China becoming increasingly a stakeholder and partner of the United States and I think we’re seeing that on the Korean peninsula, largely due to a lot of efforts by the Bush administration. I think there are a lot of other areas that China could exert itself in ways that it could be more helpful and I think they can play a game internationally that is less zero-sum than the one that they have played in certain areas in the last couple of years.
I think it is also the case –it’s not that we’re suddenly going to throw aside engagement. But the fact is that we have not been serious: we have not set up metrics; we have not been able to understand how the engagement and the hedging elements of our strategy are linked together. I find when I listen to talking points coming out of the administration, in fact for most of us – and you sort of sip them like wine – they’re vintage 1998, “We’re going to engage China; we’re going to work with China.” I would say that a more accurate thing over the last couple of years is that China is engaging the United States, and that they have shaped the environment in ways that make more sense for their long term interests.
I think that we now need to appreciate the nature and the nuance of the challenge that China provides to us and begin to think more carefully about how we implement strategies, not only in the Korean peninsula, but issues in Southeast Asia, India-Pakistan, the Middle East, and perhaps Africa and elsewhere. And that a much broader strategic engagement makes sense on the part of the United States, and our expectations have to go up on a variety of issues. And I fully expect – one of the things President Bush has been very good at is speaking truth to power – and I think he’s going to raise a lot of these issues when he goes to Beijing next month.
Steinbruner: Thank you. Shall we have questions from the audience?
Question: When discussing the relationship with China, it seems to me that there are no discussions promoting the democratization of China itself. I think the democratization of China is good and is in the interest of the United States. Do you have any thoughts on this process to make China more democratic, more transparent, and more open?
Steinbruner: Congressman Skelton, can we start with you?
Skelton: Next question
Campbell: I actually, with respect, disagree. I think one of the most important elements of Jim Kelly’s testimony, Condoleeza Rice’s recent statements, Bob Zoellick’s eloquent speech, and some things that the President has said is a fairly unerring – it’s not in your face like in some aspects of the Middle East – but it’s certainly a long term goal on democratization and raising that as a prospect. So, I actually think that that’s a pretty positive and well handled set of issues. I don’t know. Jim, would you disagree?
Skelton: Let me first say I think the subconscious hesitation is the enormity of doing that. To begin with, we’re not there as we are in Iraq where we can help shape it. And number two, it’s such a large, mammoth attempt to then [inaudible]. I think by and large – you touched on some speeches – I think, pretty much today, out of sight out of mind.
Do you agree or disagree, Kurt?
Campbell: I’m probably the wrong person to ask, Congressman, because I spend so much time thinking about Asia but I think, at a public level, that’s probably right.
Kelly: I would say, with respect to Mr. Skelton’s question, that is right, at a public level. But on a more sweeping basis I’m more in agreement with Kurt. There is ongoing, steady emphasis on democracy. That’s certainly a key of President Bush’s foreign policy. And the way that it has approached China, I think, is important. And I think the quieter approaches can be better, if only in pointing to the successes that we see in other parts of Asia. The notion that Asia is incompatible with democracy is silly. But the reality that democracy is not so 0easy to work is also visible in Asia. The Taiwan experience, itself, posts an exceptionally important example for China.
Skelton: Jim, let me ask you a question: what leverage, if any, do we have on China to urge it to, or to cause it to look more favorably upon democracy.
Kelly: The leverage we have is in the aspirations of the Chinese people and in the inherent opening of that economy to the global world. Notwithstanding all these clever attempts to control the internet, the fact is that people’s voices in China are a lot more important than they were and the government tries to funnel them in the direction of kind of a basic nationalism.
But I was struck by this unsatisfactory statement, or position, whitepaper or whatever it was, on democracy that was issued by the PRC just a couple weeks ago, which somehow claimed it was a democratic dictatorship – which, by the way, I understand those words are actually in the constitution of China. Just that China is feeling compelled to have to assert something like this, assert something, by the way, that is inherently silly, is a step forward. And it’s going to bring a kind of a pressure that may, in the end, be more decisive than by trying to threaten some sort of a tariff on a particular commodity.
I think the other part is an emphasis on rule of law. To be successful, to be the stakeholder that Bob Zoellick called for China to be, all these commercial undertaking have to honor the rule of law, and the human rights concerns that are constantly pressed. There, too, China has to be more involved with the rule of law than the party regulation ruled by individuals. I think there has been some progress on this. Critics can correctly say it’s been way too slow, but I think we’re moving in that direction.
Forbes: I think one of the things that we see, I would echo, although it’s certainly slower than what we’d like to see, I tend to believe that as you continue to increase the per capita income, and you continue to see wealth flowing to individuals in China, that need for democracy, that desire for democracy starts springing out. I don’t think we’re going to see a top-down change in China. It’s going to have to be something that’s growing from the bottom-up.
One of the things, though, that is interesting – and what we try to do is to distinguish between what we’d like to see and what we actually observed – the folks that I’ve spoken to both in China and outside of China have an interesting take on this, at least what they’ve shared with me – Kurt, you and Jim would know far better – I don’t pick up a lot of anti-communist feeling from them; I pick up a lot of pro-democracy feeling. And that’s different. You know, when you go into Iraq, we heard so much about how everybody hated Saddam Hussein. But the folks that I talked to who even are very pro-democracy have not developed this hatred of the communist government. And when you talk to them it’s not like they come in and say, “We just hate the communist government.” It is that they like democracy.
And that’s been an interesting shift for me and maybe some of you have witnessed something different but at least the people who have come to me and that I have talked to – that’s an interesting twist.
Steinbruner: Thanks, that’s a very interesting point. Another question?
Question: I’m sure you are aware that there are elements in Japan that would prefer to build an army rather than a self-defense force. I was wondering if you had any thoughts on that.
Kelly: There are obviously tensions, and this is a serious concern between China and Japan. But your question, more specifically, and you didn’t use the term but it is used by some in China that the “rearmament” of Japan is being pressed. The rearmament of Japan, sir, is not being pressed. There is an intensification of nationalism, but Japan’s defense budget is still well under 1% of its economy. And I don’t think there’s any country that spends more and gets less for its defense dollar than Japan does. They have taken the procurement of military hardware to an economic state that is mind boggling.
On top of it, as long as the US-Japan alliance remains very important capabilities, such as the ability to project power directly, more directly have been foresworn by Japan in addition to nuclear weapons. So, yes, more money is being spent for ballistic missile defense. I hope it will be effective. You hear a lot of complaints from China about that. But I’m not sure that a proper balance is for China to keep building ballistic missile after ballistic missile and for anybody to say that it’s not fair for Japan to try to have the capability to shoot one or two of them down.
Steinbruner: I’d like to just interject a follow-up question about the Chinese military buildup: Could each of you comment about what your own judgment is as to the purpose of that, what China sees as its objectives in that?
Skelton: In the short term, it’s a question that…the issue of Taiwan rises to the front. Will there be intimidation or, Heaven forbid, something worst despite the fact that when Randy and I were in China the discussion, at length, every meeting we had, at length, at least two thirds of these meetings was a one-sided discussion about Taiwan. And everyone used a softer phrase except the defense minister who used the phrase “military force.”
In the long term, I suppose military buildup is a hedge against the future, whatever that future might hold. I can’t look into their minds or their intentions, but I’m sure it has something to do with the long range position of where they want to be in this world, whether it be by trade, influence, or military moves. I don’t know, but over the shorter term it relates directly to Taiwan.
Campbell: Just quickly to the young gentleman that Jim Kelly answered: I agree with that. I also think what’s astonishing is that Japan’s response to a fairly substantial military buildup vis á vis China has actually been very modest.
I would say China’s diplomacy towards the United States has been extraordinarily effective, probably as effective a diplomacy of a rising state to a dominant, existing state in recent historical experience. However, their diplomacy towards Japan has been a failure, and has accentuated divisions and disagreements in ways that I don’t actually think are in China’s interests and, I think, have created more problems. So, I’m actually more anxious today about relations between China and Japan today than I am about China and Taiwan.
Skelton: Let me ask a question: I hope I have the facts straight but didn’t, in recent weeks, Japan announce a parallel decision with the United States regarding Taiwan vis á vis China? Would you tell us how you see it?
Campbell: Yes, I think it stands as a very important diplomatic initiative between the United States and Japan. It doesn’t mean that Japan is going to do a military adventurous thing vis á vis Taiwan or perceived aggression from China. But it does say that Japan now aligns itself with the United States in wanting a peaceful handling of the situation across the Taiwan Strait. And I think that’s important.
But I am worried about US-China-Japan relations and the level of skirmishing that’s going on is alarming, and I think there very well could be an incident in the not-too-distant future. And that kind of incident would send shockwaves throughout Asia, as a whole.
Now, what was the question, Maureen, that you asked about what does China want militarily? What does China want? The first question is, “What does China want overall?” and the reality is I don’t think we know and I don’t think they know yet because they’re in the process of evolving. And also, even though it’s not a democratic society, it is still a pluralist society. And there are elements in Chinese society that want to coexist and work with the United States, and there are elements that are deeply threatened and anxious about the United States. The key is how those sectors and groups play out over time.
I agree very, very much. I think the way that Rep. Skelton laid it out is exactly correct. But what has surprised us, though, is that China’s modernization in certain areas has been more rapid than we would have anticipated, as Jim said: in ballistic missile capabilities, submarines, some naval capabilities. And it is aimed, at least in the short term, almost exclusively at Taiwan. Now, military power is fungible and it can be used for other things downstream.
But China would raise the issue - it has on several occasions with Western interlocutors - that, look, ‘We’re a growing power. We have every right to have a military power that is commensurate with our role in the international community.’ And they would say, ‘The fact is, in 2004, the United States had a larger defense budget than the rest of the world combined.’ Right? So, it’s not clear that we’re in a position to say to countries, ‘You can’t have a military buildup.’ We have a very substantial military and I think we feel very comfortable with that.
I think that we’re on better footing if we argue that what we want China to do is to be more transparent about it, communicate more with the neighbors, and to communicate with China that, if they continue along these paths, it’s likely to trigger consequences in the region – the so-called security conundrum – that will not be in its interests or any of our interests. So, slowing down on missile production, slowing down on some of these things is not only in our interests but in theirs.
Question: I would like to ask whether there might be mixed messages on US policy vis á vis China, Taiwan, and Japan?
Skelton: May I ask the gentle lady a question before you folks answer this question? Do you agree with me that the Taiwan Strait is the most dangerous part of the world?
Question: I believe the situation between China and Japan is more incendiary, at this time, than the situation between China and Taiwan.
Skelton: Thank you.
Steinbruner: Since strategic ambiguity seems to be working, maybe we’ll ask you to comment on that, Jim?
Kelly: I’m not sure that strategic ambiguity.... Obviously, there are plenty of misconceptions because there is so much complication, so much history. As I think about Congressman Skelton’s question of whether this is the most dangerous…you know, you can answer these questions a lot of ways, and I think I agree with the answer you’ve just given that perhaps the tensions now are more serious with Japan. But the more likely possibility that could cause a serious armed conflict between the US and China is, in fact, the Taiwan Strait. And if that’s the largest thing that could bring us to each others throats – and it could, and it could do so fairly rapidly – then I think it’s a strong argument. It’s valid.
The questions, though, about the US and Taiwan military, what needs to be sold, I think that Taiwan needs to proceed a little more vigorously by setting aside some of the domestic politics that are there and figure out for itself just what kind of a military that it needs to have to deter and complicate. The fact is the PRC, even in weaker days, could have overwhelmed Taiwan, and it could certainly do so now. The trick is not a military balance. The task is to make sure, though, that the Taiwan military complicates the military planning of hardliners in the PRC so that they never think that this is something they could get away with in a very short time.
My own personal sense of this is that if the leaders of China thought that one tough week would bring the subjugation of Taiwan that there would be strong temptations to do that. And I’m not sure, partly for historical reasons, that the military forces of Taiwan have been optimized to perform that deterrence mission. I find a lot of muddy thinking about offensive capabilities, about seemingly glamorous and very costly weapons that might not be very effective and a lot less attention to the hard work that’s involved.
Campbell: If you look at the history of diplomacy between the United States-China-Taiwan previous to the Bush Administration, the seven or so administrations, it is generally a record of secrecy, conspiracies, accident, bungling, misstatements and misunderstandings. And that includes the Clinton Administration, as well. And I think basically the Bush Administration has continued in that proud American tradition. A lot of stuff has happened that, you know, ‘gee, I didn’t know that,’ or ‘this was stated and then you have to kind of…’ and that’s just because these issues are so incredibly contentious.
I think, however, where the Administration has succeeded is communicating some essential truths: one, I think they have communicated very powerfully that military provocation will not be accepted and I think that’s been very clear; number two is – to a level that, I think, the hardliners in the Republican party have been shocked – President Bush’s team has said to Taiwan, ‘we’re not going to take certain provocations.’ And I think actually that has been a surprise for some.
I think what generally tends to happen is, when you first get in the canoe, it’s a little wobbly and once you get going it gets…and that’s exactly what’s happened with China-Taiwan relations, I think, in this administration as a whole.
The biggest problem, I think, is that we have a very complicated relationship when it comes to military issues. And I think the theory of the case, at the start of the Bush Administration, was somehow that previous administrations had said, ‘no, no, we’re not going to sell all these weapons,’ and they were going to open up, and that Taiwan was going to buy everything in sight, and that, you know, we’d have a very different kind of relationship. And of course, for a host of reasons – and it’s not just Taiwan’s fault, we have not assisted them on submarines, in fact, we’ve made it very much harder than probably it needs to be, but a whole host of domestic issues in Taiwan, preoccupation in the United States, difficult interagency coordination - has made it very challenging to come up with a game plan about how to proceed. And I agree with Jim, a much more fuller assessment about how to go forward probably makes sense inside Taiwan and between the United States and Taiwan.
I find, myself, when I’m in meetings with Taiwanese they will say, ‘why are you forcing us to buy all these weapons?’ So, it’s gone from five years ago, ‘you won’t sell us anything’ to ‘why are you forcing us?’ And ultimately that’s just not very helpful.
Forbes: Maureen, if I could just…because I think Ike and I are going to have votes in just a minute that we’ve been signaled to go to but there’s a couple of observations that we have to have.
You know, Jim can write the best statement in the world that we could all sit back and say, ‘oh that’s exactly what he means.’ But – he talked about earlier sitting on this side of the desk – I know I read a lot of things about what made Congress do what they did. And I look and that and I say, ‘my Gosh, if we would have put that much thought into it and that much analysis,’ but that’s not what drove it.
And so what we’re constantly looking back to – when you deal with the folks in Beijing or Taipei – is, you know, they’re not always parsing these words quite the way we are: and they have agendas; and they have groups that are moving things, and groups that are twisting things; and there’s a lot of paranoia out there from all sides.
One thing Kurt said that I fully agree with, I think they have botched the Japanese diplomacy, but I think that they realize that now, to a degree. And I think they’re trying – and you can see them trying – to recover from that.
The second thing that Jim said we just can’t forget. There are two worries that I have out there. One of them is a vacuum; that is the United States leaves a vacuum, I think it just invites problems to take place. And the other one we can’t allow to happen is we can’t allow the Chinese government to overstate their strength and the ability that they have, whether it’s to move into Taipei or anyplace else.
And Maureen asked a question a while ago about, ‘what is the purpose of their military buildup?’ And Kurt answered it a hundred per cent right, ‘we don’t know.’ Nobody knows. They don’t know. I really believe that, if you look in terms of geography.
But if you look in terms of capability, they know and we know. And here’s the capability move they’re doing, it’s very clear: they’re building up a navy that has very little to do with Taiwan. There’s no way you need nuclear vessels to deal with Taiwan. If you look at the size Navy they’re building, I think they definitely have a blue-water goal for their navy, in terms of capability.
The other thing they’re moving towards is cutting our technology edge. As everybody here agrees, what scares us is we never know what they’re coming out with. You know, because the new sub that they came out with, we didn’t know until that hit.
One interesting thing to me if you look at it, there’s a fellow named Warren Katz who does a lot with modeling and simulation, goes around the world speaking. When he goes – and normally he’ll have about 200 engineers that show up to hear him speak anywhere in the world – when he went to China to speak he had 5,000 engineers that showed up, and they were asking cutting edge questions, working on cutting edge projects. And he came back and he said, ‘My gosh. Where is this technology edge that we think we have?’
The last two things they’re pushing on, I think, is this jointness thing which I don’t think they’ve really gotten together yet, but I think you’re seeing them trying to move on how they operate in a joint fashion.
And the last thing that we’ve got to be very careful about is air superiority, which I think that they’re going to look at. And that ties in to two things: type of aircraft you have, type of pilots you have, but also the type of communications you have and how they impact on communications.
So, what I’m more concerned about than their geographical goals is where we see their capabilities moving and how we respond.
Steinbruner: Thanks very much. These guys have to go to vote, so if you want to ask a couple of additional questions, we’ll keep our other panelists here.
Question: You had mentioned in your statement that you thought the neo-cons were shifting focus, perhaps, from the Middle East to China. What do you see as the implications of that? What do you think they want as a US policy towards China? If that does become mainstream or US policy what do you think will happen?
Campbell: That’s a good question; I don’t really know the answer. I know that, you know, I think there’s a tendency among that group to try to anticipate what are the next strategic challenges facing the country. I think there’s probably a tendency to think of military challenges more than anything else. And I think they perceive those challenges emanating from China. It also has elements of the democracy and human rights that have been prevalent, also, in the Middle East, as well.
I would say, generally speaking – and, again, this is not a scientific experience on my part – I had always thought that the level of this group’s primary expertise was in the Middle East. And so, I find, at least in some of our discussions, a tendency to appropriate Middle Eastern analogies and assumptions into an environment that is very different. I don’t know, Jim may have a different experience, but I always found that, in the 80’s and 90’s, when people talked about Asia, they often used European analogies. And Asians would always be polite and nod. But I always know, when Asians hear European…sort of, ‘well, in Europe it’s like this.’ That generally means, ‘I don’t know very much about your region.’
So, I don’t know. It was just an interesting sort of experience in the sense that, after putting so much effort and focusing the very significant capabilities of the US government on Iraq, this enormous adventure, to now be thinking about something else when we’re right in the middle of…it surprised me a little bit. That’s all.
And Jim may have a different experience.
Kelly: I wasn’t at the meeting that you were there but I do recall in ’99 – I also have great trouble identifying who is a neo-con and who is not a neo-con…
Campbell: …particularly now.
Kelly: …but if the New Republic and Weekly Standard have anything to do with neo-cons they were both noting with alarm the development of China about six or seven years ago. So that may not be something new.
Question: I wanted to commend them while they were here for getting this Caucus started. I hope this is just the start. Basically, that’s just my main comment. We really need something like this. It doesn’t get a lot of attention. Something that does unclassified research, unbiased research that is important.
Campbell: I concur with that.
Steinbruner: I think we can all concur with that.
Campbell: We were going to try to host the Caucus for a dialogue. I have to talk to Jim about this but we all agree this is overdue. There are some other efforts on China but some of this is known as ‘objective analysis’: you give us the objective; we’ll give you the analysis. We want a little bit more open, freewheeling discussion.
Steinbruner: I’d like to thank everyone in the audience and certainly thank our panelists very much.
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