Anti-Terrorism Measures Since September 11

Friday, June 2, 2006

A CNP Roundtable Led By Warren Rudman

February 18, 2004

Summary

Former U.S. Senator Warren Rudman joined a group of national security and intelligence specialists at the Center for National Policy for a discussion of the progress on anti-terrorism measures since September 11, 2001. The meeting was off the record. What follows is a general summary of key comments.

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Roundtable Highlights

Senator Rudman opened the meeting by pointing to two issues of priority concern.

He said first that it is essential to address improvements needed in U.S. intelligence collection and analysis, but warned against setting unrealistic expectations. He expressed the hope that on-going reviews will emphasize practical, achievable changes that can be implemented readily. He emphasized improved human intelligence, training for analysts, and language capabilities.

Second, he called for better standards by which to allocate funds for homeland security. Rudman acknowledged the difficulty of making precise determinations about specific threats and he also took note of the politics involved in funding decisions. He said that, nonetheless, Congress should require the Department of Homeland Security to establish a clear set of priorities, develop a rational plan for meeting the associated requirements, and a produce a set of benchmarks for evaluating progress. He expressed general support for pending legislative efforts to address this need.

Later in the discussion, Rudman cautioned against over-extension of limited military and intelligence resources. While there is a need for offensive operations as well as defensive requirements, it must be clear they are a final resort. He also strongly criticized the lack of high-level bipartisan cooperation in developing and implementing needed policy change in the legislative arena.

A general concern was expressed by several of the participants about the federal government’s reluctance or inability to make changes in the organization of intelligence operations and in other related areas, especially when useful reform proposals have been made. The reasons cited for this included ‘the poisonous atmosphere’ on Capitol Hill, the lack of relevant information for substantive discussion, and partisanship on the oversight committees.

The role of the Director of Central Intelligence and his capacity to maximize use of resources were discussed, with various participants differing as to the extent of formal change required. In particular, the need to establish a new position of Director of National Intelligence was questioned, as was the need for other major structural reforms. Several participants emphasized the importance of using existing resources and systems more efficiently.

Congressional policymaking capacity also was raised as a key area for improvement. Participants pointed to turnover on the Select Intelligence Committees in both the House and Senate and the lack of standing oversight as worrisome and problematic. Significant concern also was expressed about the failure of Congress to create an appropriate committee structure for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and prune back the duplicative authorization and review steps that remain from the period before the DHS was created.

Over the course of the discussion, there was debate about the value of specific reforms and proposals, but a strong and unified view was expressed regarding a high degree of frustration with the inability of the political system as a whole to move fast enough to implement needed improvements in U.S. intelligence and security programs.

Two areas were cited specifically. It was agreed that the highly effective Nunn-Lugar program, enacted to fund cooperative efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, needs more active support. Higher priority should be given to overcoming bureaucratic obstacles, and expanding capacity to deal with biological and chemical materials. With regard to intelligence, participants agreed that ways must be found to overcome barriers agencies impose on sharing information, including evaluation of sources.

Participants at the CNP session on Wednesday, February 18, 2004 included: Tim Roemer, CNP President; Maureen Steinbruner, CNP Vice President, Bruce Berkowitz, The Hoover Institution; Dan Byman, Georgetown University; Al Cumming, Congressional Research Service; Charlie Curtis, Nuclear Threat Initiative; John Gannon, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Lisa Gordon Hagerty, United States Enrichment Corporation; Bruce Hoffman, The Rand Corporation; Beth Larsen, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Kirk McConnell, House Permanent Committee on Intelligence; Christopher Mellon, Senate Intelligence Committee; and, David Schanzer, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

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