Taiwan, China And The 'Bush Principle'

Friday, April 21, 2006

A CNP Policywire By Maureen S. Steinbruner

As several recent events have made clear, there are few situations in the world that pose a more complex challenge to the U.S. in advancing liberty than the task of effectively addressing the status and future of Taiwan.

China, not a democracy, is preparing to enact an 'anti-secession law' intended to reinforce its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, which has a popularly-elected government and multi-party competition for national offices. That government, as presently constituted, is politically divided about how best to deal with China, but united in its concern that this new law will threaten Taiwan's maintenance of its de facto liberty.

The Bush Administration has taken several steps to maintain balance in the situation, but may have increased tensions in the process. Last year, outgoing Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage both made strong public statements confirming as U.S. official policy the view that 'there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.' These statements raised significant anxiety among the leadership in Taipei.

On the other hand, the Japanese have recently joined the U.S. in a public commitment to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and President Bush has just pointedly pressed the EU not to lift the embargo on arms sales to China specifically because this could threaten Taiwan. These actions would inevitably be seen as unfriendly by the leadership in Beijing.

U.S. efforts to insure continuance of the status quo between Beijing and Taipei have been under constant pressure for some time, as first one side and then the other has acted to redefine the 'status quo' in its favor. In effect, the current situation is now constantly being altered, with the re-balancing calling forth ever more pointed efforts by the U.S. government.

In the problem category most prominently at the moment is the impending enactment by Beijing of this new – some would say gratuitous and inflammatory – 'anti-secession' law. The language is not yet public, but the initiative is aimed overtly at 'drawing a red line' as a stern warning to those in Taipei who would pursue an independence path.

There are two theories about why this law, and why now. One is that it is a result of political inertia, generated originally as a response to the prospect that Taiwan President Chen Shui-Bian's DPP-led coalition would gain seats in the legislative elections held this past December and reinforce Chen's instinct to push the issue of 'Taiwan" as a distinct entity.

Instead, however, the more cautious opposition coalition, dominated by the KMT party, retained majority control in the Taiwan legislature. Holding on to divided government seemed to be the electorate's way of putting the brakes on the 'separation' impulse. But, immediately following the election, the anti-secession law still moved forward.

The other theory about the law, which implies that the latter action was conscious and deliberate, rather than an accident in timing, is that it is a product of deep long-term concerns in China about political trends in Taiwan. The argument is that there has been a sustained and conscious shift in PRC leadership calculations, to engage in a more proactive policy to restrain Taiwan 'separatism,' rather than simply to react to developments as they occur.'

A Chinese build-up of military capacity directed at Taiwan, and a continuing refusal to engage in talks with the Chen Shui-bian government absent Taipei's up-front acquiescence to the 'one China' formula, reinforce the impression that the PRC stance has hardened. Indeed, there is concern that China might draw the wrong lesson from the Taiwan election, seeing discussion of the anti-secession law as having affected the outcome.

U.S. policy-makers must question where this dynamic is going and how long the 'status quo' balancing act can be maintained. The recent lowering of rhetorical temperature by both sides is positive. The re-opening of direct air flights is a sign that economic interests are playing an increasingly constructive role, as well as growing in importance. But the underlying political problem is growing, as well. At its core, this is about national identity.

Over time, economic and political trends have produced among the citizens on Taiwan a de facto idea of "Taiwan" as a distinct national concept. The concept has come to have meaning for a growing group of voters who, polls indicate, place a high value on Taiwan's functional status as an independent, democratic society. This rise in national feeling has brought competition to Taiwan's politics, and complexity to the cross-strait issue.

In China, at the same time, economic and political developments are creating conditions that pose diverse challenges to central control. PRC government leaders, influential policy scholars, and even average citizens are concerned about the possibility that internal fissures could ultimately threaten China's national cohesion. Drawing a 'red line' at the idea of secession is seen by many as an essential part of the process of insuring that China – as China now defines itself – will be 'one China' for the future.

Even if the details of the anti-secession law prove to be less drastic in the event than originally feared, and no matter how muted the reaction in Taipei, the fundamentals here will continue to pose the potential for conflict. For the longer term, U.S. policy-makers should be actively seeking new approaches to this difficult and not very stable situation – internationalization perhaps beyond Japan being one interesting alternative to consider, although it is likely a measure that China would strongly resist. Meantime, the objective must be to continue to support caution and patience on both sides.

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