A New National Security Agenda

Thursday, April 27, 2006

A CNP Conversation With Ashton Carter

April 21, 2005

Summary

Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Professor of Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, met with a group of national security specialists and others at the Center for National Policy for an off-the-record discussion of potential shifts in the focus of U.S. international concerns. The following are excerpted quotes from this meeting, used with permission.

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Event Excerpts

North Korea

"The Bush Administration’s lack of progress with North Korea is hard to understand. President Bush has said, ‘keeping the worst weapons out of the hands of the worst people is an American President’s highest security priority,” but he has not resolved conflict within his own administration about how best to deal with the current problem. On one side of the debate are those who favor engagement and negotiation as the most effective means to resolving the crisis, while on the other side are those who advocate pressure and containment. This ‘either-or’ proposition is a false choice. These methods are best used in sequence. American diplomacy will be most effective if there is a credible plan prepared for coercive action. Not only has such a plan not been formulated, but diplomacy has not been given a fair shot. Consequently, South Korea and China—the two countries with the closest ties to North Korea—will, in all probability, undermine any U.S. effort to choke off North Korean commerce with the rest of the world."

"Lack of progress in the six-Party talks is due to a lot of factors beyond North Korea’s own attitudes and the Bush Administration’s internal problems. In Japan, the domestic political issue of the abductees has prevented the Koizumi government from being able to offer North Korea economic incentives large enough to affect North Korean behavior. South Korea has seemed unwilling to pressure the North on the nuclear issue at all. China has almost all of the leverage, but is disinclined to use it. China’s position in the six-Party talks is complicated, given its longer-term strategic interests. Though it does not favor a nuclear North Korea, it will try to prevent regime collapse or a U.S. military strike against the D.P.R.K. An application of U.S. military power in the region could alter China’s current approach to foreign policy (“peaceful rise”) and produce a more confrontational relationship in the future between the two countries. As of yet, the U.S. has not forced China to choose among these competing priorities."

"In the end, the resolution to this crisis may not be a treaty signed by the U.S. and North Korea. It could very possibly be an agreement between the U.S. and China, or the U.S. and the major regional powers about North Korea."

Iran

"The Iranian situation is vastly different from the North Korea issue. While North Korea is serially producing nuclear weapons, there is no indication of that process going on in Iran. Moreover, the Iranian government is more susceptible to international opinion than the Kim Jong Il regime is. That creates a lever of pressure that is not available to bring to bear against North Korea. The Iranian nuclear problem presents its own unique complications, however. Specifically, while Kim Jong Il can shut down the North Korean nuclear program himself, there is no single person in the Iranian government who can end their nuclear program. Furthermore, the program enjoys widespread public support for a variety of reasons including cultural, strategic, and economic. Many Iranians believe that, as a great civilization they are entitled to nuclear weapons if they choose to have them. They also believe that they need these weapons to guard against unfriendly neighbors, at least one of which – Pakistan – is already a nuclear power. Lastly, there are thousands of proud, non-fanatical, intelligent engineers who are employed in Iran’s nuclear sector, and think that it is outrageous that the activity to which they have dedicated themselves would be considered suspect. At some point, these people’s interests will have to be addressed."

"The European initiative, and those like it, put forward to halt Iran’s uranium enrichment program is a temporary solution, but is not done blindly. By offering Iran economic incentives, the E.U. and the U.S. seem to be making a strategic decision to buy time until the next generation of Iranians can take power. The next generation, who are more sympathetic to Western culture than those currently in power, will respond to a different set of inducements and disincentives than the current regime; however, given its popularity, there is no guarantee that the Iranians will eschew their nuclear program."

The Rise of China

"When the Bush Administration took office, its senior members brought with them the view that it was their historic responsibility to deal with the China issue. After the attacks of 9/11, however, this calculus changed drastically. President Bush opted to engage China aggressively, ultimately inviting Jiang Zemin to his ranch in Crawford, to signal an era of cooperation and friendship between the two countries. Now, that impulse has receded, and the question still remains whether China’s rising power and influence will eventually lead to a war with the United States."

"Prudent diplomacy can maximize the chance that China does not develop into an enemy. China’s rise does not have to be contentious. Their increasing influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America should be checked, but cannot be prevented. At the same time, the U.S. cannot allow the Europeans to lift the arms embargo against China. There is still a real possibility of conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, and the U.S. cannot look with equanimity on the Europeans arming a potential adversary."

Defense Spending Crisis

"A major budget crisis is developing with respect to the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security budgets. The Bush Administration came into office with a defense program of record inherited from the previous administration that could not be funded with the planned level of resources. After 9/11 came an infusion of new money which helped fund that planned program. In the meantime, however, the Department of Defense has undertaken new projects and the country is engaged in new wars, which have been only partially funded by Congress. There is a huge budget crunch on the horizon, and the problem is coming to a head."

Nuclear Risk Reduction

"Critical cooperative threat reduction programs, aimed at a controlled shrinkage and containment of the nuclear weapons infrastructure of the former Soviet Union, have been plagued from the outset by operational difficulties and philosophical conflicts. When the Nunn-Lugar program was inaugurated in 1991, the Department of Defense was not equipped to carry out the mission. There were offices to target the Soviet Union and offices to negotiate with them, but there was nobody who knew how to run large cooperative programs. A defense acquisition systems that had difficulty operating in the United States was incapable of building entire facilities Ukraine. Resistance from lawmakers on Capitol Hill has also hobbled these programs. While opposition to such initiatives in the early 1990s was understandable, by now it is unfathomable; nonetheless, it persists. Furthermore, the Russian government does not perceive this threat as urgently as many in the United States do."

"President Bush could overcome Congressional opposition, if he chose to champion this issue. It has been a mystery to many why this administration, which has chosen to be so active overseas, does not view cooperative threat reduction as an essential part of the offensive in the War on Terrorism. Given the nature of nuclear weapons, the best way to defend against their use is by prevention. Nuclear risk reduction programs such as Nunn-Lugar are the frontlines against nuclear terrorism, but the President seems unwilling to give them the high priority they need."

"Another vital tool in the global effort to keep nuclear weapons out of the worst hands is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Though some critics of the NPT suggest that it does not prevent “bad guys” from cheating, the NPT has been effective at persuading potential proliferators such as Kazakhstan and South Africa from doing so. The NPT can also help to marshal support against states that openly defy international proliferation regimes. The NPT is not, however, without defects, and they need to be addressed. It allows nations to develop nuclear power plants for ostensibly peaceful purposes, but as in the cases of Iran and North Korea, countries can exploit this provision to develop nuclear weapons. The NPT should call for states to foreswear the right to manufacture, store, and reprocess nuclear fuel. The risk of another A.Q. Khan-type network developing is too great to allow more countries to operate a closed nuclear fuel cycle."