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U.S. Cross-Strait Policy: Time To Reconsider
A CNP Policywire By Maureen S. Steinbruner
With the second inauguration of Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian, the cross-strait situation has entered a new and potentially more dangerous phase. The circumstances of the election are being challenged in court by the opposition, but whatever the outcome, prospects for constructive dialogue with Beijing appear to be diminishing.
It is time to acknowledge that the current U.S. policy framework may no longer serve to support a peaceful resolution of the differences between the two sides.
In President Chen's speech, he did say he plans to step away from several specific constitutional reforms that would pose the most serious potential challenge to the PRC, allaying U.S. government fears for the present. The overall thrust of his remarks, though, made clear his continuing commitment to an agenda that reflects the idea of consolidating Taiwan's status as a separate national entity. Private briefings with senior officials reinforced the sense that this government intends to soften its rhetoric, but is not likely to change course significantly in a new term.
This course is at the core of Beijing's concerns, and the PRC response to the speech, delivered formally after a several-day period of deliberation, was predictably negative. "The peril affecting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region still exists," a spokesman for the Beijing government's Taiwan Affairs Office said, citing Chen's holding to "the ultimate goal of independence" as the central problem.
Current U.S. policy toward the cross-strait relationship – a long-standing approach grounded in a bipartisan consensus sustained over several decades – has reflected an assumption that time will solve this problem. The theory has been that China will ultimately become more democratic, and/or that Taiwan will ultimately become so economically interdependent with China, that an accommodation will become attractive to both sides.
Meantime, a delicate policy balance has been maintained. Its objective is to ensure that neither party provokes the other and risks drawing the U.S. into a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. has been working to hold the two sides’ more aggressive instincts in check, while trying to stay out of the middle, at least in any direct way.
This could certainly prove to be a sustainable policy course, but there are increasing reasons to believe that it’s time to develop new approaches.
First, there is the possibility that China will become impatient. Some analysts, including members of the Taiwan government, saw an olive branch or two in the PRC’s May 17 statement, issued just before President Chen Shui-bian’s inaugural address. Language calling for a “peace and stability framework” and use of the term “negotiations” were seen as signs of a more open Chinese attitude. It seems, however, that Chen’s continued disinclination to adopt any form of ‘one China’ formula has registered in Beijing as a ‘deal-breaker’ even before any dealing is engaged in.
In fact, the political reality in Taiwan is one of a growing sense of national identity. Chen Shui-bian intends to reinforce and foster this feeling, in ways that can’t be characterized as deliberately provoking the PRC. The PRC, in turn, sees the idea of a Taiwan identity as leading inevitably away from its view of 'one China.' Neither side, presumably, really wants to go to the brink, but it is not clear that either side is interested in a dialogue implying serious compromise – or even accommodation – on the fundamentals.
Meantime, China has been building and positioning its military resources in a way that defense analysts see as implying readiness for a potential confrontation with Taiwan. The question arises as to how much pressure policy-makers in the PRC might now be under to ‘do something. ’ There already has been talk of passing a new 'unification' law, clearly designed to formalize warnings to Taipei.
On the Taiwan side, it is inevitable that there will be tests posed to try to expand Taiwan’s global relationships and to press forward on issues such as officials stopping in the U.S. In addition, the constitutional reform process, however domestically focused, will nonetheless engage the idea of Taiwan as a distinct nation in very concrete ways.
In all, elements are in place – including an increase of political 'gaming' on both sides – that are likely to mean tension at best, and crisis at worst.
The bottom line for the United States at this point is problematic. There may well be a period of quiet, and with luck it will be a long period, but the basic underlying conditions are not such that we can afford to be complacent. The ‘one China’ idea, in all of its various guises, seems less and less to be the convenient neutral umbrella under which differing interpretations can be accommodated. More and more, it is looking like China’s absolutely non-negotiable imperative has become or will soon be Taiwan’s fundamentally unacceptable result.
It’s time for U.S. policy-makers to start getting a ‘Plan B’ on the drawing boards, before events overtake us and we have no options.
What might the core elements of a new policy look like? Like current policy, its primary objective must be, first, to reduce the likelihood that force will be used and second, to ensure that if it is used, damage is limited and Taiwan’s security is maintained. Otherwise, however, everything probably should be re-examined, beginning with the framework.
What are China’s legitimate claims? What are Taiwan’s legitimate aspirations? If, as we instinctively believe, these are in inherent conflict, what is the appropriate mechanism for resolving that conflict? These are large and extremely difficult issues. The U.S. has significant interests at stake, and commitments.
Experts who know China, those who know Taiwan, Congress, the business community, human rights advocates and the national security establishment all need to get involved in re-thinking, while there is time. With luck, prospects for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing will hold the situation in check, but as we learned most painfully on September 11, it is imperative to be prepared for the contingencies that seem unlikely, as well as for those we expect.
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