New Strategy For Peace In The Pacific

Friday, May 5, 2006

A CNP Policywire By Maureen S. Steinbruner

Peace in the Pacific is in the hands of the people of Taiwan. However the drift of current thought and policy may imperil both Taiwan’s ability to determine its own destiny and the long term stability and security of the region.

Taiwan finds itself in a potential dynamic of decline. In the current dynamic, a rising PRC attracts direct foreign investment that used to go to Taipei. The PRC’s economy charges ahead at a rate twice as fast as that of Taiwan and the PRC translates this economic advantage into a military build up while gaining diplomatic leverage in capitals across the world. Pressure may build and lead Taiwanese leaders to see these developments and decide that an arms race is futile. They will hope that Washington will be the ultimate guarantor of stability in the region. In such a situation, not too hard to imagine coming to fruition ten years from now, Taiwan will have fewer options for its future and have a national security policy based on wishful thinking.

It is time for Taipei to break out of the current dynamic of decline, to preserve options for its own future and ensure the peace and stability of the region and perhaps the world. I offer some thoughts on a new strategic vision to achieve these ends.

First, a look at the motivations and capabilities of the PRC should be the starting point for a new Taiwanese security strategy. While one of the prime objectives of Beijing is the “territorial integrity” of China, the other values that seem to be at least as important are economic development and international prestige and acceptance. This is the pressure point upon which Taipei can focus on when building a new security policy.

The political decision in Beijing on whether to take a hostile action against Taipei will always include a calculation as to the cost in terms of economic development and international prestige. If Beijing cannot win a conflict quickly, it runs the risk of disrupting trade and investment flows. If Beijing resorts to the use of missile attacks on civilian populations or blockades that last for weeks and months, they are liable to look the bully in international public opinion. If Beijing’s forces face the prospect of suffering military defeat, even briefly, the loss of face to any regime in Beijing may be too great to bear.

To take advantage of these strategic weaknesses of Beijing is to assure a security posture that allows Taiwan to have freedom of action in its political dealings with the PRC and have a national security policy that is not based on wishful thinking. A new strategic vision requires both bold political and military initiatives.

Taiwan could consider a pledge to never launch an attack against a civilian target on the Mainland under any circumstances, even in the case of hostilities. Such a pledge in peacetime might help further dialogue, and in time of conflict, put Taiwan in a place to win the sympathy of the world and put Beijing in the role of aggressor.

The new strategy should be to intercept and defeat any and all aggressors in the air and on the seas. If troops land and establish beachheads in Taiwan, it will likely be too late for help to arrive from the international community. In any conflict, Taiwan needs to be seen as the plucky underdog defending itself against great odds, and inflicting such losses so that any aggressor would quickly lose face first because of its clear aggression and second for its inability to quickly defeat the island.

In terms of military posture, Taipei could consider a true revolution in military strategy by shifting to a professional military almost entirely focused on air/sea defense. Understanding that the strategic need for the defense of Taiwan is to raise the costs of aggression by the PRC to unacceptable levels and to gain the sympathy of the world in a conflict means the restructuring of the ROC armed forces.

The ROC Navy could acquire new fleets of the most advanced diesel/electric submarines, minesweepers and minelayers and waves of high speed torpedo boats. The goal of naval force structure should be the ability to break blockades and defeat seaborne invasion forces. Force levels would need to increase to meet the increase in capabilities

The ROC Air Force should focus on hardening and dispersing airfields to withstand attack, developing early warning radar, increasing the number of fighter squadrons and acquiring a new generation of attack helicopters that are equipped to attack submarines and landing craft.

The ROC Army could be restructured to become an entirely “special forces capable” force. The Army could reduce its numbers while greatly improving its mobility and lethality. The new ROC army would train along the lines of the U.S. Special Forces “green berets”, “Rangers” and Air Borne troops. Their missions would shift from static defense to disruption of enemy military installations during time of invasion and quick strike capability against any initial beachheads made on Taiwanese soil.

Such a military restructuring would allow for the end of conscription and the total professionalization of the ROC military. Such a plan could enhance support for the mission of the military as its defensive role would be clear by structure and doctrine. This plan could give a boost to the economy by allowing tens of thousands of young people to enter the job market rather than being conscripted.

The goal of this and any national security strategy should be for options to remain open for the future of the free and democratic people who call Taiwan home. This new national security strategy could place Taiwan in an enhanced diplomatic position as leading the way for peace in the Straits while improving capabilities so that some forces in Beijing will not be tempted to miscalculate and introduce military pressure into an already sensitive situation, thus preserving peace in the Pacific.

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