Printable Version

Can Iran's Bomb Be Stopped?

A CNP Conversation With Gary Samore

May 2, 2006

Summary

Dr. Gary Samore is vice president for global security and sustainability at the MacArthur Foundation. He previously served on the National Security Council staff as special assistant and senior director for non-proliferation and export controls from 1996-2000. This talk was part of CNP's Nuclear Security Study Group, a two-year project seeking to improve the transfer of information between nuclear security experts and members of Congress with nuclear security oversight responsibilities. This study group is funded by the MacArthur Foundation.

Prepared Remarks

I’d like to begin by discussing technical assessments of Iran’s nuclear program and then move to the diplomatic prospects for stopping (or at least slowing down) Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

Most estimates -- government and non-government -- conclude that Iran is several years away from producing enough fissile material for a single bomb. These assessments are based primarily on IAEA inspections and data and assume that Iran does not have a significant covert capability to produce enriched uranium, which I think is a reasonable assumption.

In a worse case ‘crash out’ scenario – if Iran leaves the NPT and expels IAEA inspectors, it would still take three to five years to complete construction and conduct trial operations of a small centrifuge enrichment plant (a few thousand centrifuge machines configured for HEU production) and then operate that plant long enough to produce 20-25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a single simple implosion design. Iran’s claim that it will complete a 3,000 machine centrifuge plant by the end of 2006 is very unrealistic. Since the end of suspension in January, it took Iran three months to complete and begin testing a single 164 machine cascade. As of mid-April, the IAEA reported that two additional 164 machine cascades are under construction. To complete a 3,000 machine plant would require 18 such cascades, which is likely to take at least a year or two to finish, assuming that Iran has sufficient machines. Once a 3,000 machine plant is operational, it could produce enough HEU for about one bomb a year, assuming ideal conditions, but actual production is likely to be less.

In an alternative ‘break out’ scenario, Iran could remain in the NPT and continue to build a pilot and then industrial scale centrifuge plant designed to produce low enriched uranium for nuclear power fuel, rather than highly-enriched uranium for weapons. From a purely technical standpoint, this would likely take more than a decade for Iran to complete an industrial-scale enrichment plant (planned for 50,000 centrifuge machines). Once operational, however, such a plant would create a strong nuclear breakout option, capable of producing enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon within a few weeks or even days of operation, especially if Iran accumulates a stockpile of LEU feed. This scenario would also give Iran more time to build a small covert topping facility to make break out even more secure.

So, under various scenarios, we still have a few years before Iran can achieve a nuclear weapons capability in terms of fissile material production. This is not the same as Israel’s ‘point of no return,' which is defined in terms of Iran’s mastery of centrifuge enrichment technology. I think Iran has already crossed or is very close to crossing this threshold since it resumed enrichment activities in January.

Let me turn to diplomatic prospects for stopping or at least slowing Iran’s program. During the period of the EU-3 negotiations – roughly from the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 to the collapse of the effort in January 2006 – the Europeans used classic carrot and stick diplomacy to delay Iran’s program, threatening U.N. Security Council referral to pressure Iran to suspend key elements of its enrichment program and allow IAEA inspections under the Additional Protocol. The EU-3 also offered to assist Iran’s civil nuclear power program and assure fuel supplies if it agreed to cease (or at least accept a long-term moratorium) on its enrichment and reprocessing programs.

The collapse of the effort – which began last summer when Iran decided to resume production of UF6 at the Isfahan facility and finally ended in January when Iran resumed enrichment at Natanz – reflected two factors. First, the Iranians came to realize that the Europeans were not willing to accept a deal that allowed Iran to continue its enrichment program, even with additional technical and political restrictions. If anything, the European position got harder as the talks went on, as the U.S. came around to supporting the European initiative and as the Europeans developed a stronger mistrust of their Iranian counterparts. By the way, the failure to deliver the Europeans and isolate the U.S. undercut the credibility of the negotiators (all Rafsanjani) with the Supreme Leader, who decided to support Ahmedinejad in the presidential elections last year.

Second, the Iranians decided they could get away with it. Most important, the mess in Iraq convinced Tehran that they had a window of opportunity to advance the enrichment program with less risk of a U.S. military strike because the U.S. was vulnerable to Iranian retaliation in Iraq. Iran’s sense of confidence has been strengthened by broader political developments in the region, including the emergence of a Shi’a-dominated government in Iraq, the failure of the U.S. to overthrow Bashar Assad and the election of Hamas. In addition, the tight oil and gas market gives Iran a sense of protection from international economic sanctions. Finally, Iran took advantage of the time during the EU-3 negotiations to cultivate closer ties with Russia and China, which they hoped would protect them from strong international reaction.

The current Western (U.S. and Europe) diplomatic strategy is to scare Iran with the threat of political isolation and economic sanctions into restoring the status quo ante (full suspension and Additional Protocol inspections) as a basis for resuming direct negotiations. Western diplomats do not expect that sanctions can actually compel Iran to surrender; rather they hope that the threat of isolation will strengthen the domestic opponents of Ahmedinejad, who will convince the Supreme Leader that Ahmedinejad’s confrontational tactics are too dangerous and that Iran should return to a less provocative approach. Remember the Rafsanjani crowd does not propose to give up the enrichment program; rather they argue they can strike a deal to keep the program alive – even if on a slower track – without the risks of international confrontation.

Obviously, for this Western strategy to work, Russia and China will have to play along. Here, prospects are mixed. On one hand, Russia and China would genuinely prefer to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, which would threaten their own interests in the region, and they do not want to spoil their relations with the West for Iran’s sake. On the other hand, Russia and China genuinely fear that pressure tactics will backfire and create a crisis (e.g., if Iran carries out its threats to withdraw from the NPT), leading to economic sanctions and even war.

As a result, the diplomacy of Moscow and Beijing has been very ambivalent. After much delay, they finally allowed referral to the UNSC in March and agreed a Presidential statement giving Iran 30 days to comply with IAEA demands, but only after watering down the statement to avoid hints of sanctions if Iran does not comply. As you know, Iran has ignored the Council statement and the Western group has introduced a resolution that would require Iran to comply under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which implies use of sanctions or force to enforce. Moscow and Beijing on the other hand are holding out for a resolution under Chapter 6 ‘peaceful resolution’ of conflicts. These negotiations could easily drag out until the G-8 meeting in Russia in early July, where the Western group hopes to isolate and pressure President Putin into accepting a Chapter 7 resolution.

In order to get Russian and Chinese support for stronger U.N. action, I think Washington should offer to negotiate with Iran as part of a multilateral group (such as the P-5 plus Germany) if Iran agrees to restore the suspension and resume inspections under the Additional Protocol as a condition for holding the talks. In return for making this offer, Russia and China would have to agree to support some sanctions if Iran refuses, for example, a suspension of civil nuclear cooperation and arms sales. The U.S. would win either way. If Iran accepts, it would slow the program while negotiations take place, even if a final deal cannot be achieved. If Iran refuses to meet the conditions for holding talks, the U.S. can blame Iran for blocking diplomatic progress and argue more effectively for sanctions.

To avoid this dilemma, Iran would most likely haggle over the conditions for holding talks. For example, I understand that Iran has indicated that it would be willing to resume Additional Protocol inspections, but insists on continuing some aspects of its enrichment program while the talks take place. To avoid this Iranian countermove, it is essential to line up P-5/G-8 agreement before hand that the terms for beginning a new round of talks must be total suspension, in exchange for U.S. willingness to participate in the talks if Iran meets the conditions.

Whether the Bush administration is capable of this diplomatic finesse, I just don’t know. Obviously, the administration is deeply divided over Iran policy – as it has been from the beginning – so it will require a Presidential decision. Just as Bush decided after his trip to Europe in early 2005 to support the EU-3 effort, the G-8 meetings in Russia may provide the opportunity for a new U.S. policy. The biggest obstacle may be the White House’s deep commitment to democracy in the Middle East and concern that negotiations with Iran would undermine chances for regime change. This is a legitimate concern, but the prospects for regime change in the near future are so uncertain that I think the need to respond to the immediate nuclear challenge should take precedent.

Even if talks resume, however, don’t expect an easy solution. Even if the U.S. offered to lift economic sanctions and abstain from regime change in exchange for Iran giving up its enrichment and reprocessing programs, I suspect that the current government in Tehran would refuse. Iran is insisting on retaining an enrichment capability and the option to expand to an industrial scale capability, which will give it a nuclear weapons break out option. For the same reason, the Russian proposal to host a jointly-owned enrichment facility on its soil is also not appealing to Tehran. A number of different clever technical solutions have been put forward to give Iran a face saving token of enrichment without the ability to produce nuclear weapons – black box, self-destruct, a centrifuge museum. But these technical fixes miss the point. Iran is not looking for face saving. It wants a nuclear weapons capability. Only if Tehran calculates that the risks of pursuing a nuclear weapons option outweighs the benefits, will the Iranians negotiate seriously to see what they can get in return for giving up (or deferring for the time being) their fuel cycle program. In the meantime, the main objective is to buy time by restoring the suspension as a condition for seeking a negotiated solution.

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