Negotiating With North Korea: An Option Worth Exploring

Wednesday, May 31, 2006

A CNP Policywire By Maureen S. Steinbruner

April 23, 2003

In evaluating what the U.S. stands to gain or lose from talks with the North Korean government, it is useful to distinguish between a political outcome and a substantive outcome, even though the two are obviously linked.

In the short run, the Bush administration no doubt sees political risks to anything that looks like flexibility. Coming off impressive military campaigns against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's regime, the American government has overwhelmingly demonstrated both resolve and strength. In this context, anything that looks like a concession to the North Koreans might seem unnecessary, undesirable, or both.

For the longer term, however, demonstrating a willingness to engage in diplomatic give and take while holding to core principles is likely to do the administration more good politically than simply taking an absolutist stand in yet another area of the world. More importantly, engagement with North Korea makes the most sense in security terms as well.

The North Korean government seeks full international recognition and an end to the country's economic isolation. They want both to maintain internal control, and also to participate in the world market. Taking their recent statements at face value, they see the U.S. as holding hostile intentions, and they are disinclined to give up their weapons capacity entirely. They are likely to try to hold out for a deal that provides them both a larger sense of security, and also options for the future.

The U.S. thus faces the following alternatives:

First, the North Koreans can be ignored, left to struggle against the odds without outside assistance, making up for a poor economy with arms sales and the dissemination of weapons technology. This is not a particularly appealing prospect for many reasons, including the fact that it leaves open the possibility of implosion of the North Korean state, with resulting chaos much worse than anything seen in Iraq. While some conservatives may not worry about such a scenario, most responsible analysts see this as the worst-case outcome.

Second, the U.S. can work to assemble another "coalition of the willing," to pressure North Korea on the nuclear issue, seeking to force compliance with international nuclear protocals and agreements. That's where the Bush administration has been lately. As an objective it's reasonable enough, but it has not gotten any traction to this point, largely because the other nations concerned don't think it will work. And, if it doesn't, it turns into the first option by default.

Third, the U.S. can actively threaten the North Koreans with economic and even military reprisals if North Korea begins to move actively forward with a nuclear production program (or makes some other equally provocative or dangerous move).

This is not a costless approach either, since it could lead to the necessity of steps potentially extremely damaging to the U.S. as well as to its close allies in the region and to all of North Korea's neighbors.

Finally, the U.S. can bargain, offering a combination of positive incentives and diplomatic pressure to get North Korea to end its most threatening weapons programs. Such an outcome would be not bad but also not perfect, likely leaving continuing uncertainty about verification and issues relating to the internal behavior of the North Korean government unresolved.

The obvious goal is to find a course of action that enhances U.S. and Asian security for the long term, as much as possible, at the smallest possible cost and risk. It is not equally obvious that there is a "correct" answer to this complex case. Just about everyone who looks at the situation in detail and who has followed it over time, however, comes to the same conclusion about what is possible, likely and desirable. It's the application of a combination of incentives, engagement and pressure, with no guarantees of absolute success.

This is a crucial moment for U.S. diplomacy, ironically mirroring the situation at the end of the Korean War. The aftermath of that conflict left much unresolved, but it also provided the space for South Korea to grow into a modern society, build its economy, and develop a multi-party political system. The big question at this point is whether U.S. negotiators are prepared to take 'yes, but' for an answer to the Korean peninsula's problems once again.

In the larger context, this issue presents important opportunities as well as challenges. The world, the U.S. Congress and the American public all would appreciate a sign that the Bush administration is prepared to engage in diplomacy, as well as to carry out military campaigns. The U.S. as a nation needs a plausible strategic engagement option as part of a comprehensive security policy, even if just as a hedge for the times when economic sanctions are ineffective and military action is too costly. That's exactly where things seem to be with North Korea today. It's only sensible to give it a try.

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