Going Nowhere With North Korea

Wednesday, May 31, 2006

By Maureen S. Steinbruner

December 10, 2004

Negotiations with North Korea appear to be at an impasse, again. The six-party talks are on hold as discussions take place outside the formal arena without noticeable result.

It increasingly seems that both the U.S. and North Korean governments are holding out for what the other perceives as an unacceptable pre-condition, even though both claim 'no pre-conditions' as their going-in position.

The U.S. is asking for an iron-clad commitment to full, verifiable, irreversible 'dismantlement' up front, with no 'rewards' until way down the line. North Korea is asking for a U.S. commitment to normalization up front as part of an agreement in principle in which they would pledge to freeze and then eliminate their nuclear weapons program, with a series of quid pro quo actions built into the process from the beginning.

Virtually everyone else directly involved, and many of those on the sidelines, believe that a reasonable solution is for both sides to accept a degree of uncertainty at the outset, while undertaking a mutual step-by-step process that would eventually lead to achieving most but likely not all the goals of both key parties.

Why isn't this pragmatic approach selling? A major reason is that while the U.S. and North Korean governments do share an all-or-nothing bargaining stance, they do not share a common substantive objective.

The U.S. means to roll up North Korea's nuclear capacity, once and for all, and then intends to pursue regime change as soon as this objective has been reached. North Korea wants the ability to modernize its economy while maintaining political control, and will not voluntarily give up its nuclear "deterrent" until it feels it can secure this result free from the threat of U.S. intervention.

Several of the most knowledgeable and experienced 'North Korea hands' in the American policy arena believe that a partial or, better, a 'first-phase' deal with North Korea would be beneficial, and could be made to stick. Unpredictable as its government is, North Korea should have real incentives to cooperate – at least as to disabling its plutonium processing capabilities – if serious economic aid were on the line.

This approach would have North Korea commit to freeze and eliminate any nuclear weapons programs it has but leave the negotiation of detailed inspection and elimination of uranium enrichment for subsequent resolution, on the theory that whatever the reality of North Korea's capacity is in this arena, it is a far more distant danger than that posed by on-going reprocessing of spent fuel.

The Bush administration appears willing to forego any such partial outcome, presumably counting on the reinstatement of an aggressive sanctions approach when talks ultimately fail. In this as in so many other areas of foreign policy, the Administration has taken an unremittingly hard-line: all or nothing. This approach has the appeal of simplicity, certitude, and toughness, and who wouldn't choose such an option if "all" is really on offer? But, in this case, nothing may in fact be the result.

Ironically, the North Koreans might be able to break the deadlock by accepting a process that has no direct unilateral 'gestures' from the U.S., as distinct from American participation in a six-party agreement.

In fact, they would not be losing all that much. As a practical matter, they are not going to secure failsafe protection from U.S. efforts to change their government any time in the foreseeable future in any case. And yes indeed, there is some risk, in theory, that abandoning their nuclear capability would expose them at some point to a pre-emptive attack. But, it's highly unlikely since neither China nor South Korea – nor Japan or Russia – will support an American military intervention against North Korea in the absence of a direct provocation.

With or without 'normalization,' what North Korea needs is an ironclad guarantee that it can apply for serious international development assistance – assuming it is willing to meet the standard requirements for government borrowing. Such a guarantee is more likely to emerge as a reality from the six-party talks than from any direct negotiation with the U.S. alone at this point.

Unfortunately, it might be too late for such a practical calculus to prevail within North Korea. Together, the "Axis of Evil" speech and the invasion of Iraq probably have affected that country's course of decision-making in things nuclear beyond alteration, at least for now. They perceive the U.S. to be 'hostile,' which it is, and have come to believe that they must force the U.S. into at least a neutral and preferably, a positive posture in order to secure the future of their regime.

All in all, unless something significant changes in the fundamental approaches of both the U.S. and North Korean governments, the prospects for a constructive resolution of this situation look pretty dim.

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